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The Aid Morass
by Charles Flickner

Washington. The warmest
bracketed
ever was
January
t was a strange
winter
in
by extreme cold in November
and March. The cherry trees
and magnolias weren't the only ones confused. The capital city
itself couldn't decide how to respond to the astonishing changes
in Eastern Europe and Central
America. It's blowing hot and cold
on the prospects for US aid.
As many pundits bemoan Washington's supposedly parsimonious
response to appeals for assistance,
the gap between myth and reality
in the federal government grows
larger. Perhaps the most common
assessment was reflected by a New
York Times headline, "Congress,
Hoping to Aid New Democracies,
Finds Itself Shackled by Budget."
The executive branch could respond, if it had a common voice,
"Look, we've sent up to Capitol
Hill generous appropriations requests. Why doesn't Congress get
off the dime and act?"

Almost no members of Congress stood forward with Dole, but
few criticized him. Senate Appropriations Committee chair Robert
Byrd joined in the attack on current aid priorities, but didn't focus
on Latin America. By April the
Bush administration made it clear
that, unless the global sum of
foreign aid was expanded, it too
would favor "shaving" the existing
levels for traditional recipients, including Egypt and Israel.

Politics on the Hill
Returning from a December 1989
trip to Latin America, Senate
Republican leader Bob Dole broke
a Washington taboo regarding the
sanctity of foreign aid levels to
Israel and Egypt, the Camp David
twins. Dole suggested that the
only way for the US to help emerging democracies in Eastern
Europe and Latin America would
be to reduce aid for the current
major beneficiaries: Israel, Egypt,
Pakistan, and Turkey.

Charles Flickner is a Senate
Republicanstaff member.
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The fiscal 1991 budget process
is dead in the water. With the
Democratic Congress and the
Republican president at odds over
defense spending and taxes, insiders are betting that an acrossthe-board sequester (a kidnapping

or cancellation of appropriations)
will occur in October. Only
maverick Ways and Means Committee chair Dan Rostenkowski
has shown the courage to offer a
proposal that actually reduces the
deficit to the Gramm-Rudman target of $66 billion.
With gridlock anticipated for
next year's budget, the scramble is
on to stuff additional domestic
and international spending into
the budget for the current fiscal
year, which ends on September
30. There's one obstacle, though.
This year's budget is already $4 billion over the Gramm-Rudman ceiling. Additional spending for
Panama and Nicaragua, not to
mention Eastern Europe, requires
a 60-vote supermajority in the
Senate to set aside the budget
ceiling.
Following the precedent set
with several of the contra aid packages, the Bush administration
opted to offset its $800-million aid
package for Panama and Nicaragua with equal reductions in the
defense budget. When on February 26 the defeat of Daniel Ortega
in Nicaragua's presidential election surprised Washington,
detailed legislation to implement
the Panama package was put on
hold until it could be combined
with assistance for Nicaragua.
This package, too, is to be paid for
by the Defense Department, but it
has become so bogged down in
Capitol Hill politics that Dole
stated that Nicaraguan president
Violeta Chamorro's "first term
may expire before we get the aid
down there."
It is clear no supplemental appropriation (i.e. stuffing items into
the current budget) is likely to

Y

become law before mid-summer.
Advocates of domestic spending
were unwilling to pass a "clean"
supplemental budget limited to
international items on the
president's "must do" list without
adding some of the items they
deemed urgent or unlikely to survive a Gramm-Rudman sequester.

similar arrangement is suggested-will react to using US
grant funds to keep alive the myth
that the multilateral banks never
make bad loans.

Bush and Central America
On March 13 President Bush finally decided to take personal responsibility for expediting both the
Panama package and a newly announced $300-million Nicaraguan
aid package through Congress.
Was he concerned about the
health of Panama's president
Guillermo Endara, who was then
engaged in a marathon fast
against the slow US response?
Bush's ability to get his way with
Congress should not be underestimated. His veto of the bill to
extend visas for Chinese students
demonstrated what a dogged
Bush could accomplish.
The proposed Panama aid
package set an unusual precedent.
The administration admitted that
$130 million would be the US
share of an international effort to
pay off more than $540 million
owed by Panama to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), and the World Bank.
Although US bilateral funds have
been used elsewhere in Latin
America to pay arrears and prime
the pump for new multilateral
bank loans, it has never been done
openly.
It will be intriguing to see how
Congress-not to mention Nicaragua and Panama, for whom a

The Brady Plan to reduce the
commercial debt-service requirements of selected countries does
not address the problems many
smaller Latin American and Caribbean nations have with paying off
loans to the IMF, the World Bank,
and the IDB. While the integrity
of these institutions is important,
so too may be their willingness to
accept that some of their loans
turn out sour, just like any other
banking institution.
A bipartisan agreement on
security assistance to El Salvador
is in the works. Secretary of State
James Baker inconclusively appealed for such an agreement in a

February 28 statement and held
several private meetings on the
Hill to discuss the matter. The
murder of six Jesuits may have
been the last straw for Republican
stalwarts on military aid to El
Salvador. It certainly was for
Democrats.
The fear in Latin America, that
the attractions of newly democratic Eastern Europe will divert
development aid and investment,
may prove to be greatly exaggerated. Except for Poland, there
is little public support for massive
aid to Eastern Europe. Besides,
some of the new democracies
know too well the hidden costs of
hosting a huge aid establishment,
and don't want traditional foreign
aid. Clearly US bilateral aid to
Latin America and the Caribbean
will remain far larger than assistance to Eastern Europe. The
drug war will insure that.
One of the positive results of
the US obsession with Central
America over the past decade is a
core of insiders on Capitol Hill
who have a lot invested in the
isthmus. Extensive travel and new
friendships bind many of our
leaders with those in Central
America. In Washington those
ties count.
Latin America and the Caribbean may benefit from the new
approach many are taking to Eastern Europe. The first question
asked now is, "What are your
plans?" That question is followed
by, "What do you need?" and
"How can we help?" There is less
emphasis on dollar totals. To ask
first, "How much?" is to risk being
accused of "throwing money at
the problem," and few politicians
do that in the 1990s. .
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Negotiating Shock
by Mark B. Rosenberg

cities in gasoline, medicine,
Rafael
foodstuffs,
and
n thebasic
midst
of growing
scarLeonardo Callejas was inaugurated as the new president of Honduras in January
1990. Callejas, who leads the Partido Nacional, won the presidential
election in November 1989 with
more than 50% of the popular
vote and a commanding majority
in the country's unicameral Congreso Nacional.
The new president is the most
skilled and capable leader of Honduras in this century. Callejas is intelligent, disciplined, and forwardlooking. His youth belies his
maturity. Just 46 years old, Callejas has served in a variety of government posts and as a cabinet
minister. He has campaigned on
the PartidoNacional's presidential
ticket three times, first as a vicepresidential candidate in the early
1980s. Following his party's defeat
in 1981, he cautiously negotiated
his ascendancy through a political
thicket characterized by cronyism,
old-boy networks, and proverbial
smoke-filled rooms. The force of
his personality and political acumen were decisive in his rise.
Now in the office to which he
has long aspired, Callejas presides
over a ruptured economy and a
bankrupt government. The
party's governing plan for 199094 states that per capita income is
13% lower than in 1980. In terms
of economic development, the
1980s were a wasted decade.
Callejas has few economic options, none of them good. Unlike
his predecessors, he cannot barter
use of Honduran territory for a
blank-check supply of economic
aid. Indeed, even before he took
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office, the US clearly signaled that
the "wink-and-nod" days were
over. A $70-million line of credit
from the US Agency for International Development was put on
hold to lever the outgoing government to initiate strong macroeconomic reforms. Honduras had
earlier been declared ineligible for
new funds by the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund.
But how does a government
negotiate "austerity shock" when
most of the country's citizens already live in poverty? Callejas himself recites the ugly figures: 20% of
the population earns under
US$0.50 a day and the average
annual income is under US$400.

Getting Ready
Confronting imminent economic
and fiscal apocalypse upon entering office, the new president took
measures to prepare himself for
the thankless task of restructuring
the Honduran economy. First,
Callejas mounted a comprehensive study team to identify the
country's problems and develop
alternative policy responses. With
the financial assistance of the National Endowment for Democracy,
a PartidoNacional think-tank gave
exhaustive attention to the country's economic problems. The core
of this analysis subsequently appeared in the government's Plan
de Gobierno 1990-94.
Second, Callejas enlisted Partido
Nacional advisers to work with two
US economists, Arnold C. Harberger and Daniel L. Wisecarver,
to develop a comprehensive plan
to restructure the economy.
"Policies for Efficiency and
Growth in a Market-oriented

Economy" (January 1990) is a
fascinating document from the
neoclassical school of economics,
written at the behest of the Consejo
Hondurefio de la Empresa Privada.
The study outlines two points
about the Honduran economy:
A large and growing fiscal deficit
accounts for the crisis in the
country's balance of payments
and arrears in its foreign debt
obligations.
* Due to efforts to maintain both
the exchange rate and some
foreign exchange reserves, the
economy's price structure, in internal terms and relative to the
world market, became extremely distorted.
According to the authors, there
is no realistic alternative to fiscal
austerity through revenue increases and expenditure cuts.
They advocate, then, the "shock
treatment" from which so many
Latin American and Caribbean
countries are now reeling.
The Harberger-Wisecarver
document outlines what the content of economic reform should
be. What it does not address is the
thorny and perhaps more difficult
issue of how the treatment should
be applied.

A "How to" Guide
A Wall StreetJournalop-ed article
(January 17, 1990), written by
Roger Douglas, a former New
Zealand government official,
helped to provide the operational
guideposts that Callejas needed.
Douglas claims that "the idea that
governments can retain power by
refusing to make necessary and
valuable structural reforms is, in
fact, nonsense." "Quality"

medium-term policies, he writes,
must be enacted by reformoriented governments without
compromise. Douglas concludes
that consensus will develop only if
concessions are not made to special interest groups.
To attach the austerity electrodes to the Honduran body
politic, Callejas seems to be following the principles that Douglas
suggests. For example, Douglas
argues that "you need quality
people for quality policies." Callejas has surrounded himself with
one of the most skilled cabinets
ever assembled in Central America. Known derisively by the opposition press as the "Chicago
Boys," the cabinet is a clear departure from the crony-oriented political chambas of earlier presidents.
Douglas further argues that
reform should be implemented in
"quantum leaps" and that "speed
is essential." Initially Callejas eschewed this advice in calling for
"national concertation." Yet once
he understood that it would be impossible to gain consensus in advance of strong reforms, Callejas
moved swiftly. In early March
1990 he pushed his entire package, including a floating exchange
rate, lowered tariffs, higher sales
and income taxes, and the streamlining of investment regulations,
through the Congreso Nacional. In
the process, Callejas accomplished, at least on paper, what no
democratically elected civilian
politician would have dared in the
1980s: the reform of the Honduran economy to make it more
competitive in the international
commercial and financial markets.
"Let the dog see the rabbit,"
another Douglas guideline, has
also informed the president's actions. This principle calls for clear
and continual statements to the
public about the nature of the
economic problems, the government's objectives in addressing
them, and the costs and benefits
of the options pursued. Callejas
has therefore opened himself to

the country's perfervid press, and
has asked his cabinet members to
follow his lead. These officials are
receiving high marks for the plain
language they use to explain the
government's new policies.
Still another suggestion by
Douglas for would-be reformers is
"Don't blink; public confidence
rests on your composure." Organized labor has already demonstrated against the measures, and
a number of ministers have been
chastised behind the scenes by
private-sector kingpins whose
market monopolies are threatened by the reform package. Although the package will raise
prices significantly, Callejas maintains a close working relationship
with key labor union leaderssome of whom were previously
given high positions in the party
or offices in the presidential
palace. This gentle form of co-optation, which stands in deep contrast to the fate of labor union
leaders in other Central American
countries, is distinctively Honduran. It should give the president the margin of political space
he needs to implement his policies.
Not that Callejas has been intimidated by his friends in the
private sector. In this respect he
seems to grasp Douglas's argument that the "abolition of
privilege is the essence of structural reform." Even though the
president and many cabinet members are stridently pro-business,
many private-sector leaders view
them with suspicion because of
the new administration's hold on

political power. Yet because the
president has not isolated himself
from the business sector, he continues to enjoy their support.
Along the same "anti-privilege"
lines, the new economic measures
rescind the duty-free imports enjoyed by the armed forces. Callejas's efforts to reduce the power
and privileges of the military may
well be the Achilles' heel of the
austerity package. The Honduran
armed forces, however, are no
longer empowered with the hardline security mission that the
regional militarization of the
1980s gave them. Riddled with
petty personal rivalries and corruption, the military may take its
austerity medicine too. Callejas
can succeed without their support, but his chances are much
greater if the military commits itself publicly to his efforts.
Douglas's useful column does
not address the country's most difficult issue: how to deal with the
US Embassy. Most embassy officials, though, are jubilant about
the Callejas commitment to structural reform. They are backing
their enthusiasm with aggressive
lobbying in Washington for the
additional economic assistance
that is crucial to the reform program.
Callejas has taken the initiative
and has the vision and political
perspicacity to hold his ground.
Nonetheless, he needs all the help
he can get. If this president cannot accomplish structural economic reform, no other Honduran
can. .
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Human Rights: Peruvian Responses
by Michael Shifter

record is among the
most troubling in Latin
America. Since 1987 the
UN Human Rights Comeru's
human
rights Peru
mission
has ranked
first among nations in the number
of desaparecidos. International
rights organizations, such as
Americas Watch and Amnesty International, point to patterns of
summary execution and torture
by Peru's security forces. Roughly
half the population of the
country's coastal, mountain, and
jungle regions lives under a state
of emergency.
Since the early 1980s this grim
situation has prompted Peru's
nongovernmental human rights
organizations to respond. Their
response has primarily taken the
traditional form of monitoring
government violations. Rights
groups have documented abuses
by Peruvian security forces and
denounced the governments of
Fernando Belaunde (1980-85)
and Alan Garcia (1985-90). The
groups hold the government
responsible-through complicity
or passivity-for violations against
its citizens.
Yet Peru's human rights situation has never been entirely conventional. The Belaunde and
Garcia governments were civilian
and democratically elected, in contrast to the military rule in Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile during
the 1970s, which gave the impetus
to human rights efforts in those
countries. Still, Peruvian human

P

Michael Shifter is a programofficer in
the Andean Region/Southern Cone Office of the FordFoundation.
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rights organizations followed the
traditional approach and pressed
the government to honor its legal
and political commitments.
In the past few years, however,
two tendencies complicated Peru's
already unconventional situation:
the growing strength of the
Maoist insurgency Sendero Luminoso and the progressive weakening of the Peruvian state. For
Sendero, "human rights" is a bourgeois notion, and any form of
dialogue and negotiation is out of

proach is inadequate. The traditional approach to human rightsincluding the monitoring and
criticism of government violations-fails to take into account
the growing impact of abuses by
insurgents and the ineffectiveness
of the state.
Thus an alternative approach is
in the making. Seeking not to supplant but to build upon the traditional approach, the new, more
affirmative one displays several
characteristics: it documents insurgent atrocities, strives for balance
and consensus, aims to strengthen
a nonviolent democratic center,
and stresses the education and
training of key sectors of civil
society. The emerging approach
responds in part to public opinion
that wonders whether rights violations might be an inevitable price
to pay for fighting guerrillas. It includes a new and fundamental
question: can Peru deal effectively
with insurgent groups within a
democratic framework that
respects human rights?

Insurgents and the State
the question. Meanwhile the
weakened state can neither deal
effectively with the insurgency nor
provide basic protection for its
citizens. Insurgency and breakdown have taken place in a context of unprecedented economic
crisis, an expanding drug economy, and political polarization.
Over the last decade the spiral of
political violence has claimed
more than 18,000 Peruvian lives.
In response many of Peru's
nongovernmental human rights
groups realize their traditional ap-

Sendero Luminoso, which emerged
nearly a decade ago as an armed
force in the impoverished department of Ayacucho, is now in firm
command in the coca-rich Upper
Huallaga Valley, and enjoys a substantial presence in Junin, a key
center of food production, transportation, and communication.
Even coastal cities, including
Lima, are witness to a rise in Sendero activity. Curiously only where
there are effective state surrogates, such as church and peasant
organizations in Puno, have Sendero advances been stalled.

R

The insurgency's targets are no
longer restricted to government
party representatives, police and
military officials, and, most tragically, peasants who often have little choice but to collaborate with
such government personnel. Sendero's aim of gaining local support
among the population's organized
sectors has meant that the guerrillas' main competitors in this
strategy-labor leaders, development workers, priests, judges,
teachers, and opposition politicians-have also been threatened,
intimidated, and killed. Particularly alarming to the country's extensive network of service and research organizations working in
rural development was Sendero's
brutal assassination of peasant
leader Victor Lozano and anthropologist Manuel Soto in Huancayo in January 1989. Although
the municipal elections of November 1989 took place without major
problems, Sendero's campaign of
pre-election terror against local officials left a vacuum of authorityand a climate of fear-in many
communities.
Violence also characterizes the
tactics of Peru's second guerrilla
group, the five-year-old Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru
(MRTA). Although widely regarded as much less formidable
and worrisome than Sendero,
MRTA (or at least a faction of the
movement) may be adopting some
of the Maoist group's tactics, as
evidenced by the January 1990
assassination of Peru's former
defense minister, Enrique L6pez
Abujar.
Faced with economic and political crisis, the Peruvian government has responded ineffectively

T

to such threats. Its policy tends to
favor military over political strategies, though the emphasis varies
depending on the region and the
military official in charge. Many
analysts observe that in areas such
as Ayacucho and parts of the jungle region, the government's
counterinsurgency efforts sometimes deepen the resentment of
the local population against the
security forces, thereby inadvertently adding to Sendero's popular
support.
Such support was evidenced in
March 1989, when Sendero successfully attacked the police base in
the jungle town of Uchiza, leaving
ten officers dead. The townspeople reportedly witnessed public executions with little outrage.
Nearby military units failed to

S

respond and provide support to
the embattled police during the
six-hour assault, a dramatic display of the Peruvian government's
lack of coordination in combating
the insurgency.
An army general directing
military operations in the Upper
Huallaga Valley reportedly had
some success in fighting Sendero,
chiefly by appealing to the hearts
and minds of the local population.
But the widely publicized approach proved to be at odds with
a drug policy that gave highest
priority to defeating the drug traffickers in the area.
The growth of Sendero and erosion of state capacity help account
for the July 1988 emergence of a
loosely coordinated network of
paramilitary groups known as the
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Reports: Human Rights

Comando Rodrigo Franco. (The network takes its name from the
Alianza PopularRevolucionaria
Americana [APRA] party official
who was killed by Sendero in
1987.) According to a recent Peruvian congressional investigation,
the Comando is linked to sectors of
the current APRA government.
The paramilitary groups have
murdered several leftists and have
threatened and intimidated journalists, politicians, professors,
labor leaders, and television personalities. That the government
has failed to recognize, and take
action against, the Comando has
further frustrated human rights
efforts.

Innovative Approaches
Until the last few years, criticism
of insurgent actions served mostly
as an appendage to denunciations
against government abuses. In
striving for greater balance and
public credibility, however, some
rights groups are now calling attention to the abuses committed
by both sides in the country's internal conflict.
Meanwhile the limitations of
traditional frameworks have led to
a reassessment ofjuridical approaches to human rights. Some
leading advocates-including
Diego Garcia-Sayan, executive
director of the Lima-based Comisi6n Andina de juristas, and Carlos
Chipoco, one of the founders of
the Instituto de Defensa Legalargue for the application of international humanitarian law to deal
with internal armed conflict and
political violence. They point to
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which focuses on the
rights of noncombatants and on
medical attention to the wounded.
Garcia-Sayan urges open discussion about whether Sendero's de
facto control over some of Peru's
territory offers a sound juridical
basis for maintaining that the insurgency is guilty of human rights
violations. This posture would
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depart from the conventional
human rights approach that says
abuses can, strictly speaking, be
committed only by government
forces.
Also rethinking traditional approaches are Americas Watch,
Amnesty International, and other
international organizations. For
example, in its October 1988
report on Peru, Americas Watch
devotes a full section to "Violations of the Laws of War Committed by the Insurgents."
Human rights groups, national
and international, are collaborating in working out the new conceptual challenges.
What are the practical implications of such new thinking? Many
Peruvian rights groups are targeting key institutions that at best are
neglected by the state. Since 1988,
for instance, the Comisidn Andina
deJuristashas undertaken a training program for judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, aimed at enabling them to perform their roles
more effectively within an otherwise weak judicial system. The
three-day courses encourage the
use of habeas corpus writs and
focus on ways to secure basic constitutional guarantees. In an effort
to minimize corruption, promote
the rule of law, and improve
human rights conditions, the program provides a service to judicial
personnel, who often are working
at considerable risk, in places such
as Lima, Ica, Puno, Huancayo,
Cuzco, and Trujillo.
Concurrently human rights
education in Peru has become
among the most sophisticated in
Latin America. Through a variety
of educational methodologies and
pedagogic materials, educators
are fostering the rule of law and
the exercise of basic rights and
responsibilities "from below."
Coordinating these efforts is the
Red Peruanade Educaci6n en Derechos Humanos, which consists of six
organizations: the Escuela de Derechos Humanos del Instituto de Defensa Legal, the Comisi6n Andina de

Juristas,the Comisidn Episcopalde
Acci6n Social, the Centro de Estudios
y Accidn para la Paz, the Instituto
Peruanode Educaci6n en Derechos
Humanos y la Paz, and the Centro
Amaz6nico de Antropologia y Aplicaci6n Prdctica.
As the political crisis deepens,
the Red Peruanade Educaci6n en
Derechos Humanos is intensifying its
activities, working together with
an array of local organizations-including churches, labor unions,
public and private schools, and
adult and youth groups-throughout Peru. Such activities can be
properly measured only in the
long term. Nonetheless, they are
supporting sectors ignored by the
state and perhaps susceptible to
Sendero advances.
Some human rights groups are
complementing such activities by
exploring alternative perspectives
on political violence in Peru. Since
1987 the Instituto de Defensa Legal
has organized public discussions
that involve representatives of
diverse political tendencies, including the Marxist and non-Marxist
left, APRA, and the Frente
Democrdtico, the center-right coalition headed by novelist and
presidential candidate Mario Vargas Llosa. Further, in an August
1989 working paper, the Instituto
presents a range of views about a
controversial issue: the supplying
of arms by the government to
peasant self-defense committees in
Peru's emergency zones.
Peru's human rights situationand the emerging responses of
some nongovernmental rights
groups-is perhaps unique in
Latin America. Although rights advocates in, say, El Salvador and
Colombia are also increasingly
stressing principles of humanitarian law, the extremism of Sendero
sets the Peruvian case apart. Also
without parallel in Latin America
is the fact that the victims of
Peru's armed insurgency include
members of popular organizations
and social movements with historically close ties to human rights

groups. And while the weakness of
the state is not peculiar to Peru, in
possibly no other country has this
problem been so acute and have
human rights groups so clearly
acted to fill the vacuum and assume the offensive.
Can these incipient human
rights efforts help to reverse
Peru's deteriorating situation?
The obstacles to reaching out to
diverse sectors of civil society are
considerable, and programs involving the mass media could be
much stronger. Rights groups
themselves wonder about their
own impact, often questioning
whether Peru's fundamental
problems of violence and governmental breakdown are amenable
to even innovative and well-conceived strategies. Indeed, in a disturbing development, in February
and March 1990 some Lima-based
rights organizations were the targets of attacks.
The vast majority of Peruvians
are hoping the next government,
scheduled to begin in July 1990,
will do better than the Garcia administration in addressing political
violence. Yet none of the presidential candidates, including the
surprise first-round and run-off
winner Alberto Fujimori, engaged
in serious discussion about counterinsurgency policy. Their failure
to do so was troubling.
Most analysts agree that the
Fujimori government is likely to
confront the Sendero insurgencyand the process of social disintegration-for some time to come.
As the politics are played out,
Peruvian human rights groups
will continue their resourceful,
often courageous, efforts to buttress the country's fragile political
democracy. .
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Austerity and Labor
by John Walton

T

tated the labor movement in Latin America.
Austerity policies have
crippled the region's
he debtstandards,
crisis has particudevasliving
larly those of the popular classes.
With no end in sight, the debt
crisis has undermined the developmental hopes of these people and
their institutional representatives-hopes that once defined
Latin America's social objectives.

Social Consequences
A central feature of the crisis is the
striking uniformity of "structural
adjustment" policies in debtor
nations. Under the aegis of the
International Monetary Fund,
structural adjustment involves a
package of austerity measures:
currency devaluation, increased
interest rates, decreased imports,
lessened regulation of foreign investors, privatization of stateowned firms, and above all,
reduced government subsidies for
food, transportation, petroleum
products, education, and health
services. This package is intended
to create "market-driven" economies that generate income for
debt servicing.
Yet, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, structural adjustment is
leading to economic stagnation in
Latin America and elsewhere in
the Third World, and is accelerating the transfer of income from

John Walton is professor of sociology
at the University of California,Davis.
He is completing a book, Cities in
Revolt, with David Seddon.
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poor nations to developed ones.
The middle and lower classesespecially the urban poor-are suffering the heaviest burden of debt
servicing. Cuts in government
spending mean decreased earnings and job losses for state
employees, as well as reduced
food and transportation subsidies
for the urban poor. The sale or
closure of state firms also eliminates jobs, while import restrictions hurt small commercial firms
and national industries that
depend on foreign equipment.

Debt and Labor
The debt crisis has undercut the
institutional power and living standards of Latin American labor.
These losses are evident in the
magnitude of the regionwide
decline in real wages and corresponding rise in both unemployment and underemployment; according to the Inter-American
Development Bank, "informal"
jobs have become the only employment alternative for growing numbers of Latin Americans. Labor's
losses are also evident in drastic
reductions in the welfare benefits
previously won by unions, including major cuts in real per capita
expenditures on state health and
education programs.
Besides imposing heavier burdens on Latin America's lower
and middle classes, the drop in
living standards undermines the
ability of labor unions to effectively represent workers, as reflected
in organized labor's diminished
legitimacy, internal divisions, and
chastened militancy. For instance,
labor analyst Edward Epstein observes that the higher the rate of

unemployment and the more
repressive the policies of governments, the fewer the number of
strikes and strikers in Latin American countries. In this respect the
debt crisis and austerity measures
have created a political climate
favorable to government assaults
on organized labor, as demonstrated in cases such as Argentina
under Carlos Menem, Bolivia
under Jaime Paz Zamora, and
Mexico under Carlos Salinas de
Gortari. After reviewing several
examples of state-labor conflict in
Latin America during the 1980s,
British scholar Ian Roxborough
concludes that, while each state attempted alternately to divide politically the unions and forge a new
social pact, "the general story is
one of 'muddling through' rather
than of a clear strategic plan ...
As the effects of the economic
crisis have bitten deeper into the
working class, labor's capacity to
respond has also diminished."
A related trend is that the combination of debt, austerity, and
economic restructuring has
reshaped the social basis of the
political arena to the disadvantage
of organized labor. On the one
hand, the expansion of informal
employment and the weakened
political clout of unions reduce
the size of organized labor's following. On the other hand, the key
issues of the last decade and the
foreseeable future center on the
politics of consumption-access to
housing, transportation, education, and health care-rather than
the politics of production, the traditional focus of organized labor.
"Workplace" issues have not disappeared from Latin America's
political arena, but they tend to

generate less mobilization than,
and to overlap only partially with,
matters like subsidy cuts, price increases, and service reductions.
Meanwhile the economic, social,
and political conditions associated
with debt and austerity have given
rise to new forms of popular organization and action, including
religious base communities, barrio
associations, coordinadoras(national networks of regional and
local grassroots groups), and
protests (e.g., paros civicos, demonstrations, general strikes, riots,
and looting).

IsOrganized Labor Irrelevant?
The trend of domestic politics in
Latin America involves increasing
popular movements, eroding elec-

toral support for traditionally
dominant parties (even of the
putative left), and declining labor
union influence. The political role
of organized labor, however, has
differed from country to country.
In countries like Peru, Ecuador,
and Bolivia, organized labor has
been the principal agent of austerity protest, particularly in the
form of general strikes that ally
workers with students, public
employees, and middle-class merchants and consumers. More
generally, comparative findings
link levels of urbanization and
unionization to variation in the occurrence and severity of austerity
protest. Paradoxically, organized
labor has been both a key element
in causing austerity protest and, if
the evidence is correct, a reluctant

or opportunistic follower of
popular initiative.
Latin America's political future
is uncertain. It combines state
austerity policies with instances of
energetic popular organization.
The political direction of the
1990s depends on whether the
managers of structural adjustment
prevail, or whether labor and
neighborhood organizations as
well as other local movements
form a representative and effective alliance. International models
are available for either coursefrom Mexico's PartidoRevolucionarioInstitucional to Poland's
Solidarity. The question for organized labor is whether it will follow
the well-worn paths of patronage
or build an independent, democratic social movement. m
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El Pacto: There They Go Again!
by David Barkin

ow short are our collective memories! Mexico's
stabilization efforts of
1987-90 are reminiscent
of its tripartite pact between labor, business,
and government during World
War II. Its purpose was to
restrain wage and price increases
"so as not to damage wartime
production." In a private
telegram to Washington, the US
ambassador of that moment,
George S. Messersmith, pleaded
for emergency shipments of corn
to Mexico, writing that: "[in spite
of the industrial boom] I have not
been so pessimistic with regard to
the outlook here at any time since
I came to Mexico as I am now.
The cost of living has gone up
tremendously. We are living really
on a social volcano here now. The
situation of the workers is intolerable for everything they eat has
gone up enormously and wage increases do not seem to help for
the price controls have been inadequate" (quoted in Stephen Niblo,
"The Impact of War: Mexico and
World War II," 1988).
Mexican collaboration with the
war effort consisted of the wholesale acceptance of American
demands to reorient production
to the needs of the US economy,
on terms established by the US
government. This reorientation
caused the major shortfall in food
David Barkin is professor of economics
at the UniversidadAut6noma Metropolitana,in Xochimilco, Mexico City.
His recent publicationsinclude Distorted Development: Mexico in
the World Economy (Westview
Press, 1990).
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IN.

production as US demands led
Mexico to switch almost onequarter of its maize land to oil,
edible seeds, and natural fibers for
export. This policy and US opposition to the shipment of corn to
meet Mexico's needs provoked
widespread domestic opposition.
Even before the war's end it was
clear Mexico had paid dearly for
increased economic activity: it had
granted extraordinary influence
to the US in reshaping the Mexican economy and formulating its
future development policies. The
distribution of wealth became
much more regressive, setting an
unfortunate standard for the
decades to come.

Problems and Promises
In light of the wartime policy,
today's Pacto de Estabilidady

AGS

Crecimiento Econ6mico (PECE) is
nothing novel. PECE promises to
reverse the economy's stagflation.
The administration of Carlos
Salinas de Gortari reassures Mexicans that Brazil's failed Cruzado
Plan and Argentina's sorry experience are irrelevant. Even without
looking south, Mexico's austerity,
wage freezes, and inflation of the
1940s should instill serious doubts
about claims that it can resume
more equitable growth without
first reversing the recent increase
in income inequality and decline
in living standards. During the
early 1940s real wages plunged by
more than 50% and did not
recover until 1971.
The mainstays of PECE are
wage and selective price controls
and a drastic reduction in government spending, especially for
social services. Such austerity

imposes a disproportionate burden on the working classes, whose
share of national income had already fallen from 36% in the

mid-1970s to 25% in 1987. Open
unemployment is rising and pro-

duction for the domestic market is
shrinking due to price controls,
gutted tariff barriers, and tum-

bling purchasing power: real
wages are now lower than those

of the late 1930s.
PECE identifies inflation as the
major economic problem and the
rekindling of growth as the principal objective. The government
accepts responsibility for much of

since domestic interest rates are
three or four times higher than
international rates, the cost of servicing peso obligations is twice as
large as that of the foreign debt.
Mexico's internal debt offers juicy
compensation for support of
government policy by the wealthy.
Nevertheless, it is an exorbitant
price to pay for the inflow of
foreign capital required to sustain
the rest of the economic stabilization package.

creased the value-added tax, improved tax collection, imposed
some levies on profits, augmented
prices for public-firm goods and
services, and closed or sold some
public firms. Yet servicing the
debt forces the government to

borrow additional money, increasingly from domestic lenders as
foreign banks seek to limit their
exposure. Since 1980 the internal
debt in pesos has swelled by 350%
to more than $50 billion--equal to
nearly half the foreign debt. But

generator of employment: production of goods for the domestic
market. This downward trend includes the sharp decline in production of basic crops by small
farmers because food imports
have reached record levels. Open-

Salinas administration's policy.

The Present Danger
Contrary to the official view, infla-

tion is not the most serious of
Mexico's ills nor is its control the
key to economic recovery. As ex-

port production is booming, the

measures such as foreign borrow-

Even as the administration has
hiked revenues and cut costs, the
inherited imbalances continue.
On the revenue-boosting and costsaving side, policymakers have in-

Mexico's traditionally important

have reaped the benefits of the

programs and modest social welfare programs with inflationary

financing massive capital flight by
these same people.

traditional exports such as auto
parts, but foreign competition and
price controls have restricted

sumer durables and food imports
has resulted in a drain on foreign
exchange, and only the wealthy

it results from sizable budgetary
deficits. Officials fail to point out,
however, that these deficits arose
from the state's inability to tax the
incomes of the small but politically
powerful group of rich Mexicans
who control most of the country's
wealth. Consequently the state
had to finance massive investment

sidize their investments in the
hopes of spurring economic development, while allowing and even

responded with a surge in non-

ing the border to a flood of con-

the recent inflation, asserting that

ing. Despite the avarice of the
wealthy, the Salinas administration's programs continue to sub-

proved goods at more attractive
prices to Mexican consumers.
Indeed, the private sector has

domestic market is in the throes of

Policymakers say this package is
necessary to curb inflation and set
Mexico on the path to recovery.
Superficially they are correct. By
substantially reducing the budget
deficit as a percentage of the national product, the Salinas team
has slashed inflation from its searing pace of 1987-88 to its tranquil
level of a decade ago. And the rate
of economic growth doubled in
1989, to about equal with the rate
of population growth.
The technocrats claim this
scenario is boosting the confidence of domestic and foreign
business in the government's
ability to manage the economy.
They argue that, along with the
opening up of Mexico to international competition, such confidence will stimulate private investment and create a more efficient
productive apparatus. They insist
that this apparatus will enable
Mexico to compete successfully in
world markets and provide im-

depression. The reasons are the
large-scale decline of the population's purchasing power, the

shrinking private investment in
production for the internal market, and the allocation of government spending away from social

services and infrastructure. For
most Mexicans, PECE is driving a

set of nails into their coffins.
The danger of ignoring this
problem is a lesson that should
have been learned from Mexico's
experience during World War II.

Once again producers are responding with zeal to the government's changing signals and incen-

tives. Unlike the earlier epoch,
domestic shortfalls in basic foods,
raw materials, and industrial

products can be readily supplemented by imports-for those
who can afford them. With the
advent of liberalized foreign
trade, imported consumer goods
are crowding the shelves of upscale stores.
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But the livelihood of the
majority of Mexican producers
and workers depends on the eroding domestic market. Linked to
this erosion is the disappearance
of jobs and the development of
new family survival strategies. "Invented" jobs are burgeoning as
people attempt to find niches as
itinerant merchants and informal
suppliers of assorted services,
while national chains counterattack with marketing strategies
targeted at the shrinking middle
and upper classes. Also geared to
the latter groups are expanding
financial services, as people with
savings are taking advantage of
high returns in Mexico's banking
system and stock market, as well
as speculating in construction.

farmers remunerative prices for
their labor, the government could
induce them to bring their lands
back into commercial production
and enable Mexico to regain food
self-sufficiency. In turn, this process would stimulate rural demand for goods and services from
the rest of the economy, thereby
benefiting every social group in
Mexico. The country's balance of
payments and budget would both
improve. Although this approach
would raise consumer prices, the
cost would be small indeed com-

An Alternative Road
Ironically Mexico's suffering on
this account is needless. The fundamental obstacle to prosperity is
the official definition of the crisis
as afinancial problem. This perspective leads to a search for new
ways to restructure the debt, generate foreign exchange, and reduce government spending. Thus
authorities reject approaches that
incorporate small producers; instead they favor export industries
using the latest technologies.
Policymakers seem impervious
to the claim that Mexico could be
enjoying a thriving internal
market. In the countryside, idle
productive resources in the hands
of small farmers could eliminate
more than $3.5 billion in food imports and create upwards of two
million jobs in a short time. In the
cities, idle light-industrial capacity
could be mobilized to produce
consumer goods, construction
materials, and light machinery to
supply a reinvigorated domestic
market and employ many additional workers.
Such an alternative would require the reintegration of small
farmers into the main stage of the
national economy. By offering
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pared to the prosperity that the
strategy would generate. Specific
programs for the needy would be
less costly than current commodity support programs.
What are the objections to such
an apparently simple and inexpensive program? Some argue that
Mexico, including its small
farmers, have lost their ability to
produce basic food crops in the
volume required for national selfsufficiency. Others are frankly
apprehensive about the political
implications of offering the small
farmers an opportunity to earn
the minimum wage. But such objections are misplaced: available
land already in the hands of small
producers, combined with the increased yields possible with existing technologies and available
resources, could assure important

production increases in a very
short time. Political barriers are
more significant: some political
bosses would find their hegemony
threatened as their former clients
gained greater autonomy. By
facilitating this autonomy the
political monopoly of the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional might
be threatened, especially if the
small farmers felt the new program was won in the face of the
party's opposition.
PECE does not even permit
consideration of such an alternative. It focuses on inflation and
deceives people into thinking that
other ills can be corrected by minimizing price increases. Reducing
inflation by deepening the country's depression will merely create
further problems. What is needed
is a reorientation of thinking
about the roots of, and solutions
to, the economic crisis. The crisis
can only be overcome by mobilizing the productive potential of the
Mexican people.
This alternative strategy does
not directly challenge the current
export-oriented approach. Mexico
has the resources to continue increasing its production for export
while broadening its economy to
incorporate once again basic food
production. The alternative
strategy offers essential benefits to
millions of small farmers and
rural and urban workers whose
job opportunities have become
precarious and incomes have been
seriously eroded. It would also accelerate the incipient process of
political democratization. As such
the strategy might be threatening
to those who benefit most from
the concentrated power and
wealth that characterizes the reigning neoliberal approach.
All groups in Mexico would
have higher incomes if the alternative approach were implemented.
Mexico has the potential to both
boost its exports and reclaim its
domestic market. Why then must
its leaders continue repeating the
mistakes of past decades? .

~
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Bolivia's Perestroika?
by Eduardo A. Gamarra

the dubious record of
26,000% inflation, the worst
ever in Latin America and the
seventh highest in recorded
n the mid-1980s Bolivia held
history. With the August 1985
ascension of Victor Paz Estenssoro
to the presidency, Bolivia experienced a dramatic restructuring of
its political economy. By June
1986 a comprehensive austerity
program, dubbed the Nueva
PoliticaEcondmica (NPE), reduced
inflation to 10% and, at least according to government officials,
established the foundation for economic recovery. The transformation of Bolivia's political economy
was so profound that loyalists in
Paz Estenssoro's Movimiento
NacionalistaRevolucionario (MNR)
proudly labeled it Bolivia's perestroika. Even the cautious London
Economist called the recovery "the
Bolivian Miracle."
Many international officials consider Bolivia's NPE to be the only
successful austerity program in
Latin America. For Washington,
Bolivia has become a showcase of
democracy and an example of
what other nations in the region
could accomplish if they adopted
the "correct" free-market policies.
Domestically Bolivia has established a new political consensus
around the NPE's premises. Although Paz Estenssoro and MNR

EduardoA. Gamarrais assistant
professor ofpolitical science at Florida
InternationalUniversity and an associate editor of Hemisphere. He is the
co-author (with James M. Malloy) of
Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia
1964-1985 (TransactionBooks, 1988).
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no longer rule Bolivia, his succesor, Jaime Paz Zamora of the
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, has steadfastly stayed the
course since taking office in
August 1989.
To put this situation in context,
it is worthwhile to recall that Paz
Estenssoro and his MNR led
Bolivia's 1952 revolution. He and
MNR presided over the nationalization of the country's tin industry, a broad-based agrarian
reform program, the enactment of
universal suffrage, and the downgrading of the military. More significant, they initiated a process of
state-led economic development
that lasted until 1985.
In November 1964 a military
coup replaced 12 years of MNR
rule with 18 years of military
dominance over Bolivian political
life. Most military governments,
however, followed (with US
backing) MNR's state-led development strategy. Responding to
domestic and US pressure and to
imminent economic collapse, the
Bolivian military attempted an orderly withdrawal from the political arena in the late 1970s. Only
after a tumultuous four-year
period of transition plagued by
coups, countercoups, and aborted
elections was civilian rule
achieved. In October 1982 when
Hernin Siles Zuazo, one of
MNR's founders, was sworn into
office, Bolivia was already experiencing the worst political and economic crisis of its history. During
a hapless three-year period, Siles
was incapable of controlling or
satisfying demands from social
groups and was largely responsible for precipitating Bolivia's
record hyperinflation.

Austerity Begins
On August 29, 1985, Siles's successor, Paz Estenssoro, surprised
MNR and the leftist groups that
had supported his election by announcing the NPE austerity program. The NPE represented a
dramatic restructuring of the
development strategy established
33 years earlier by Paz Estenssoro
and MNR. It sought three objectives: the liberalization of the
economy, the ascendance of the
private sector as the central actor
in economic development, and
the recuperation of state control
over key state enterprises. The
latter included the Corporacidn
Minera de Bolivia, which had been
appropriated by the Federacidn
Sindical de TrabajadoresMineros de
Bolivia, the backbone of the
CentralObrera Boliviana (COB),
Bolivia's powerful labor confederation.
Through general strikes that
paralyzed the nation, COB had
sabotaged every attempt by the
Siles government to impose austerity. In the process, however, it
eroded the effectiveness and legitimacy of strikes and other forms of
union protest. Thus, when Paz
Estenssoro's new MNR government fired 22,000 mineworkers,
COB could barely muster enough
support to call a general strike.
Once capable of bringing down
governments, COB was reduced
to weak defensive actions to
prevent the imposition of even
harsher measures.
Bolstering the NPE's credibility
was the presence of Harvard
economist Jeffrey Sachs, who became the government's principal
adviser. Aided by several Bolivian

economists, Sachs put forth neoliberal recommendations aimed at
stabilizing the economy and ending hyperinflation through a
shock therapy of reducing fiscal
deficits, freezing wages and salaries, devaluing the currency, and
drastically cutting public-sector
employment. The government
also announced privatization and
similar measures.
A key to the NPE's success was
exchange rate stabilization.
Through liberalization of the
foreign exchange market and the
establishment of a bolsin (auction
mechanism) in the Banco Central,
the black market for dollars came

The Bolivian government
pioneered innovative schemes to
reduce its foreign debt. For example, in 1988 it established a
debt-for-nature swap under an arrangement with Citicorp and Conservation International. In 1989
Bolivia, funded by aid from
several nations, purchased $300
million of its private debt through
IMF-mediated channels. Such accomplishments impressed international donors. Bolivia is now the
third largest US aid recipient in
Latin America, after El Salvador
and Honduras, as well as Latin
America's highest per capita recipient of laDanese aid.
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which it has yet to recover. For instance, in September 1985 hundreds of labor leaders, including
COB leader Juan Lechin, were arrested and banished to remote
jungle towns. With absolute control over congress, the executive
imposed NPE-related legislation,
such as a new tax code, that consolidated the policy of economic
restructuring.
Although the pact broke down
during the 1989 election campaign, its three-year tenure
revealed that the success of
austerity policies in Bolivia (and
elsewhere) is related directly to
the capacitv of overnments to es'
-maintain stable coalithe Bolivians have
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economists, Sachs put forth neoliberal recommendations aimed at
stabilizing the economy and ending hyperinflation through a
shock therapy of reducing fiscal
deficits, freezing wages and salaries, devaluing the currency, and
drastically cutting public-sector
employment. The government
also announced privatization and
similar measures.
A key to the NPE's success was
exchange rate stabilization.
Through liberalization of the
foreign exchange market and the
establishment of a bolsin (auction
mechanism) in the Banco Central,
the black market for dollars came
to a grinding halt. Critics point
out, however, that the bolsin also
created a means for laundering
"narcodollars," profits from the
cocaine industry.
Most analysts argue that the
NPE revealed Paz Estenssoro's
abandonment of the 1952 revolution's goals. Arguably, however,
the NPE reflected less a reversal of
the system of political economy
linked to Paz Estenssoro and
MNR than an adaptation of the
original revolution to a new set of
realities. For Paz Estenssoro and
his economic advisers, state capitalism had reached its final limits.
Shortly after launching the austerity plan, Paz Estenssoro
claimed the NPE flowed directly
out of his original approach to
revolutionary change.
Yet Bolivia's economic recovery
proceeded at a snail's pace. The
collapse of the tin market and the
decline in the price of natural
gas-the nation's only sources of
hard currency-threatened to undermine the government's program. Even when faced with a
severe recession and soaring unemployment, Paz Estenssoro
refused to alter the NPE guidelines. His tenacity was finally
rewarded in 1987 as the economy
grew for the first time in the
decade, and continued growing,
with inflation stabilizing at 20%
per year.

The Bolivian government
pioneered innovative schemes to
reduce its foreign debt. For example, in 1988 it established a
debt-for-nature swap under an arrangement with Citicorp and Conservation International. In 1989
Bolivia, funded by aid from
several nations, purchased $300
million of its private debt through
IMF-mediated channels. Such accomplishments impressed international donors. Bolivia is now the
third largest US aid recipient in
Latin America, after El Salvador
and Honduras, as well as Latin
America's highest per capita recipient of Japanese aid.

Implementing Austerity
At the heart of the NPE's success
was the government's ability to
neutralize opposition from labor
and political parties in congress.
A so-called Pactopor la Democracia
between the ruling MNR and
former dictator General Hugo
Banzer Suarez's Acci6n Democrdtica
y Nacionalista (ADN) guaranteed a
political base for the government's
policy. For the next three years
Paz Estenssoro used the pact to impose three congressionally sanctioned states of siege that dealt
Bolivian labor a severe blow, from

which it has yet to recover. For instance, in September 1985 hundreds of labor leaders, including
COB leader Juan Lechin, were arrested and banished to remote
jungle towns. With absolute control over congress, the executive
imposed NPE-related legislation,
such as a new tax code, that consolidated the policy of economic
restructuring.
Although the pact broke down
during the 1989 election campaign, its three-year tenure
revealed that the success of
austerity policies in Bolivia (and
elsewhere) is related directly to
the capacity of governments to establish and maintain stable coalitions. That the Bolivians have
learned this lesson was demonstrated by new president Paz
Zamora, a social democrat, who
entered into the Acuerdo Patri6tico
with Banzer's ADN before assuming office in August 1989. Like the
Pactopor la Democracia, the new alliance has enabled the executive
branch to control opposition from
labor and political parties in congress and to press ahead with the
NPE. In November 1989 Paz
Zamora imposed a state of siege,
arresting and banishing hundreds
of striking teachers.
Pragmatism may have replaced
ideology in Bolivia, but the rotation of state patronage among
formerly bitter rivals is the underlying basis for short-term stability.
Whether patronage can guarantee
the long-term stability of the NPE
and Bolivian democracy is questionable.

An Exportable Cure?
The NPE's effectiveness is fragile,
and its impact varies by economic
sector and social class. To begin
with, the health of the Bolivian
economy is tied to the export of
natural gas to Argentina. Yet Argentina has not met its payments
on time, and economic reactivation in Bolivia has been severely
hampered by chronic delays.

Hemisphere . Winter/Spring 1990

Reports: Austerity

I

I
-

-I

-

ill

Several economists argue that
the health of the Bolivian economy is also tied to the revenues
from the booming cocaine trade.
Other economists note that the impact of the drug trade is less than
speculated. In any case, Bolivia
has not found a legitimate way to
tap into this industry and must exercise great caution so as not to
stir the wrath of Washington's war
on drugs.
Meanwhile Bolivian industry,
construction, and mining have not
fully recovered. Commerce, especially the import-export sector, is
the only profitable venture. But
with booming contraband,
prominent entrepreneurs have
demanded substantial changes in
the NPE tariff policies to protect
them from foreign competition
and bankruptcy. Indications are
that President Paz Zamora will
yield to these pressures.
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Socioeconomic indicators also
reveal the slow pace and tenuous
nature of recovery. Unemployment stands at 20%, salaries
remain extremely low, and prices
for most products are out of reach
for the majority of Bolivians.
The potential loss of jobs by
members of a transformed sector
of the labor movement presents
the most serious domestic challenge to the NPE. After searching
in vain for employment, thousands of Bolivia's displaced miners
migrated to the Cochabamba valleys to grow coca leaf. After reestablishing unions, they emerged
as the most powerful sector of organized labor. This development
poses major problems for the
Bolivian government, which has
attempted to comply with coca
eradication agreements with the
US. If the government attempts to
forcefully "relocate" this sector

one more time into the ranks of
the unemployed, growing tensions could erupt into an explosive confrontation.
Despite these negative portents,
Bolivia has become a "model" of
stable governance and sound
economic management. But optimism about the model's exportability must be tempered by two
considerations. First, the smallness
of the Bolivian economy made stabilization possible with relatively
small amounts of capital. Second,
the particularities of Bolivia's social and political structure enabled
the NPE's advocates to defeat
their opponents, especially the
labor movement. At least for now,
the NPE's shock therapy has stabilized the Bolivian economy, but
the cost is apparently much
higher than what its neighboring
governments are either willing or
able to impose on their people. .
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Reports: Environment

costa Kica

,

Resource Challenges

by Lori Ann Thrupp

ith a remarkable
27% of its national
territory protected
in national parks
and in forest, biological, and Indian
reserves, Costa Rica is widely considered a successful model for environmental policy. Among its
most effective conservation initiatives are fiscal incentives for
reforestation and debt-for-nature
swaps, where international environmental organizations absorb
small portions of the foreign debt
in exchange for the maintenance
of parks or reserves. The nation's
environmental laws, whose reach
extends from pesticide use to
waste disposal, are elaborate and
ambitious in principle. Its universities and US-linked research institutes, such as the Organization for
Tropical Studies, are addressing
environmental issues on a growing scale. Moreover, Costa Rican
"ecotourism" has blossomed into a
multimillion-dollar business.
Costa Rica's long-standing efforts are indeed significant. Yet a
deeper look into its environmental
problems and policies raises fundamental questions: How effective
are the country's conservation initiatives and groups? And are they
confronting its most urgent
problems?

Lori Ann Thrupp is a postdoctoralfellow with the Energy and Resources
Group at the University of California,
Berkeley. Her publicationsinclude
"Pesticidesand Policies:Approaches to
Pest-ControlDilemmas in Nicaragua
and Costa Rica," Latin American
Perspectives (1988).
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Impacts, Impediments,
Weaknesses
In spite of the country's efforts,
the degradation of Costa Rican
resources is worse than ever.
Deforestation occurs at the rate of
50,000 hectares per year, far
beyond the 3,000 hectares that are
annually reforested. Meanwhile a
host of problems, including watershed degradation, soil erosion,
water and air pollution, overfishing, sanitation and waste
problems, and pesticide damage,
results in rising economic losses
for rural and urban Costa Ricans.
Costa Rica's poor bear a disproportionate share of the environmental burden. For instance,
those peasants who are being displaced to marginal lands and can
least afford fertilizers are the principal victims of deteriorating soils.
Similarly those people who reside
in the growing informal settlements of urban areas are the main
victims of inadequate sanitation.
A principal reason for the worsening of environmental problems
is that the state's policies do not
directly address their causes. The
fundamental causes of resource
degradation in Costa Rica, as in
most countries, are politicaleconomic forces rooted in the
wider international market. The
Costa Rican economy revolves
around the export of coffee and
bananas, followed by beef and
sugar, in exchange for manufactured goods from the US and
other developed countries. Costa
Rica's trade dependence has combined with a chronic fiscal deficit
to generate one of the world's
highest per capita foreign debts.
Given regionwide economic crisis

and the strings attached to the
flow of aid, the US and the International Monetary Fund have
pushed the Costa Rican state to
implement the twin policies of
domestic austerity and nontraditional export promotion.
Costa Rica has substantially increased the value of its nontraditional exports (e.g., palm oil,
tropical fruits), yet this structural
adjustment strategy has led to augmented imports of cereal to feed
the nation's population, and has
contributed to worsened rural and
urban socioeconomic inequality.
Moreover the adjustment strategy
has exacerbated the trade deficit
and aggravated pressures on
natural resources. From an environmental standpoint, the nexus
between the Costa Rican and
world political economy impedes
local attempts to promote sustainable development.
Against this backdrop the
nation's environmental policies
tend to be ad hoc responses to
emergencies rather than cohesive
efforts at prevention. For one
thing, government agencies are
commonly pitted against each
other in turf battles. For example,
while the Ministeriode Agricultura
encourages farmers to clear more
land and produce more food, the
DireccidnForestaladmonishes them
to plant trees, not crops. The absence of coordination extends to
nongovernment organizations as
well.
Another dimension of ad hoc
policy is that, though Costa Rica
has thousands of pages of environmental laws, most of these are
weak and unenforceable. Among
the reasons are the political constraints of debt and austerity,

which restrict the state's monitoring capacity while they pressure it
to stimulate economic growth.
Conservation initiatives, such as
Direccidn Forestal'stree planting
programs, suffer from poor maintenance; and lacking alternatives
and despite laws to the contrary,
squatters and colonists continue to
deforest public and private lands.
Meanwhile environmental
regulations often contradict state
incentives for economic development. Thus reforestation efforts
clash with laws that enable people
to acquire title to land by "improving it" through farming and
deforestation. They also clash with
a measure that grants landowners
an income tax deduction of
$1,000 for each hectare reforested. Besides its bias against middle and low-income rural people,
who do not pay income tax, the
measure subsidizes land speculation by permitting entrepreneurs
to plant seedlings, receive the deduction, and then let the trees die.
Still another weakness stems
from the foreign models that form
the basis of Costa Rican policy.
Costa Rica emphasizes wilderness
protection-a move applauded by
mainstream North American and
European environmentalists-but
wildlife, tourism, and science research are not interests of the
majority of Costa Ricans, who are
poor and neither have access to,
nor derive income from, these activities. Although inequality of
landownership in Costa Rica is
not as extreme as elsewhere in
Central America, the problem is
nonetheless severe: 37% of landholders are small farmers who
own just 1% of all farmland, while
the top 1% of landholders own
more than 25% of the farmland.
Furthermore thousands of agricultural workers are landless. In view
of the inequitable distribution of
landownership, the extent of protected area is perhaps excessive.
Given this agrarian structure,
the creation of parks or reserves
by wealthy individuals, such as the

acquisition of 50,000 hectares for
Guancaste Park by US biologist
Daniel Janzen, perpetuates inequitable development. This problem
includes the growth of foreign influence over local decisions and
resources. One aspect of foreign
influence is debt-for-nature swaps.
Such swaps alleviate only a minute
percentage of the external debt,
yet they favor the interests of
mainstream environmentalists at
the expense of the basic needs of
the rural poor.
Programs to induce the rural
poor to adopt environmental conservation have been ineffective.
They rarely involve participation
of the local people and are topdown in approach. Among such
programs are DireccidnForestal's
"demonstration" plots, which emphasize large-scale commercial
reforestation using exotic species.
This practice is usually impossible
for small farmers, mainly because
the size of their landholdings is insufficient and must be devoted to
food crops.
The Direccidn Forestalhas begun
some agroforestry projects that
are more suitable for the rural
poor, yet these projects often overlook indigenous agroforestry practices and try (unsuccessfully) to
push methods developed in research stations. In addition many
rural people oppose parks and
forest reserves and have little interest in wilderness recreation.
Their stance is logical, since either
they lack farmland and resources
or, if they are landowners, they
are often left to deal with the
nuisance of wild animals from
reserves.

deteriorating resource conditions.
There are no easy answers to
these problems. It is clear, however, that the social dimensions of
conservation cannot be ignored,
and that the political-economic
roots of the problems must be
directly confronted. The rural
poor deeply understand the value
of resources as seen from the
perspective of their basic needs.
The promotion of sustainable,
equitable development requires
that their interests be given
priority.
Among the needed transformations is the ending of state incentives and subsidies for large
cattle and timber enterprises,
along with state action to eliminate land speculation in frontier
areas. Such measures must be
accompanied by land reform to
redistribute farmland and to transfer some of the protected area
into agroforestry programs, as
well as state incentives and credit
for establishing agroforestry and
soil conservation. A related priority is the diversification of food
crops needed for feeding Costa
Ricans, and the cessation of the
environmentally and economically
deleterious emphasis on agricultural exports.
Strategies of grassroots "empowerment" and democratic participation are likewise vital, as is
the redirection of some funds
from parks and wildlife protection
to such strategies. Equally important is the taking of initiative in
the US and other industrial
powers to eliminate problems
such as toxic substance exports
and investment patterns that exploit Third World labor and

Implications

resources.

Costa Rica has given more attention to environmental problems
than many other developing
countries, yet the popular image
of Costa Rica as ecologically
progressive is somewhat illusory.
The country's fragile economy is
also aggravating pressures on the

There is potential for effective
change in Costa Rica if it can emphasize policies of social justice
and sustainable development. The
suggested reforms may sound infeasible and radical; yet until they
happen, rhetoric about solving environmental problems will remain
empty and superficial. .
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

No Sugar Daddy

Watch Out

Montecristo at Risk

Caribbean and Central American
sugar producers are watching
developments in the 1990 Farm
Bill debate in Washington. New
US policy on sugar imports will
emerge from these discussions.
Foreign producers and US interests such as the Sweetener Users
Association hope Congress will
lower price supports and reduce
import quotas. They have tough
opposition, however, including
Rep. Kika de la Garza (D-TX),
who chairs the House Agriculture
Committee. Speaking in Florida
in February 1990, the legislator
repudiated a ruling from the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (June 9, 1989) that US
sugar import quotas are illegal.

New Exchange of Information
Agreements between the US and
Peru and between the US and
Mexico have added to the worries
of US banks who fear losing wary
Latin American depositers. The
agreements mandate that the US
Internal Revenue Service and the
sister institutions of cooperating
governments exchange, upon
request, information concerning
taxes of a resident of either
country, including records
provided by financial institutions.
Already Barbados, Bermuda,
Dominica, the Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago are signatories to the agreement. The
participation of Costa Rica,
Bolivia, Colombia, Guyana, and
Panama is pending.

The Environmental Project on
Central America reports that El
Salvador's Montecristo Park is at
risk because of the Trifinio Plan to
develop the border area shared by
that country, Honduras, and
Guatemala (Greenpaperseries, No.
4, p. 10). A habitat for the quetzal
because of its boundless cloud
forests, Montecristo has been subject to increasing pressure by
refugees and settlers fleeing the
ravages of the country's civil war.
In a rare instance of cooperation
among the neighboring countries,
the Trifinio Plan will allow "unregulated" agricultural, mining,
and timber development that will
"increase pressure on the park."

Capital Flow

Come Back to Jamaica
Ad agency Young & Rubicam
pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy and paid a $500,000 fine
to settle a charge that it violated
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
to win a Jamaican Tourist Board
account. In exchange for the guilty plea and fine, the Justice
Department dropped a federal
racketeering charge. After settling
the case, the agency's general
counsel gave his corporate "spin"
to the incident. According to the
Wall StreetJournal(February 12,
1990), he stated that the charge
was "...the most metaphysical
felony that I've ever pleaded guilty to."

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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Caribbean Commission
A commission to examine the
future of Caribbean development
has been named and will be
housed on the Mona Campus of
the University of the West Indies
in Jamaica. The commission is
mandated by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to develop
the region's economic, political,
and cultural agendas for the 21st
century. Its report on Caribbean
economic integration and the impact of Europe's unification must
be ready for the 1992 CARICOM
summit. Among its members are
Dame Nita Barrow of Barbados
and Vaughan Lewis of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States.

Latin Finance'sApril 1990 edition
offers a thorough analysis of the
Eastern European challenge to
Latin America. Several viewpoints
amplify the growing debate on the
subject. Sir William Ryrie of the
International Finance Corporation reasons that Eastern Europe
may not pull investment away
from Latin America. Kissinger Associates analyst Alan Stoga states
that the US needs to concentrate
its efforts first on Latin American
trade partners. A former World
Bank spokesperson, Frank Vogl,
asserts that a "double standard is
being applied that falls heavier on
the democracies of Latin America
than on the would be democracies
of Eastern Europe." Latin Finance,
a Euromoney magazine, is published in Coral Gables, Florida.

III

E

Buried in New York
While in Europe in early February, Mexican president Carlos
Salinas de Gortari pleaded with industrialized countries not to forget about Latin America in the
wake of new markets and investment opportunities in Eastern
Europe. In case you missed the
story, it was buried in the New
York Times's February 2, 1990,
Business Section, under the New
York Stock Exchange Bond Trading listings.

Streamer of Consciousness
Speaking at a military ceremony
in Fort Myer, Virginia, on March
8, 1990, President George Bush
stated "We're here to add another
campaign streamer to the roll call
of glory, the roster of great
American campaigns-Yorktown,
Gettysburg, Normandy and now
Panama." Streamers were attached to the flags of the four US
military services, each representing a different war or military campaign from the revolutionary war
to Grenada. Bush went on to say
that the new streamer was "most
of all" for the US soldiers killed in
Panama.

Saya not Lambada
While the lambada had Americans
and Europeans trying new contortions to the tune of "Chorando se
foi," the Bolivian authors of the hit
sued Brazilian and French producers for copyright violations.
Los Kjarkas, who composed

"Llorando se fue" with a Saya beat
from the Bolivian Yungas region,
reportedly settled for a meager
$260,000. Bolivian nationalism
has been fueled by cries that the
paltry sum added insult to the injury of plagiarism.

On the Move
Ertha Pascal Trouillot is Haiti's
first woman president. Named to
succeed Lieutenant General
Prospero Avril, the former supreme court justice presides
over a 19-member council of state
as Haiti prepares for elections that
may be held in October 1990.

A Degree of Change
In February 1990 Miami journalist Pablo Alfonso interviewed a
dissident law professor from
Cuba's Universidadde Camagiiey.
The professor outlined the growing restlessness among Cuba's intelligentsia and students. Particularly troublesome to Castro's
regime, he said, are Moscowtrained Cuban social scientists
who understand and sympathize
with the need for glasnost and
perestroika.The 29-year-old
refugee capped his interview by
declaring that in Cuba "it's more
dangerous to have a degree from
Moscow than to have one from
Harvard."

Surf's Really Up
Lester Moreno, a 17-year-old
Cuban, had been riding the
island's waves for nine years. On
March 1, 1990, he caught the "big
one" that surfers dream about.
Carrying a backpack loaded with
fresh water and condensed milk,
he glided from Cuba's Varadero
Beach into an easterly wind that
pushed him and his sail board to
within 30 miles of Miami, where
he was plucked from the ocean by
the US Coast Guard.

Heraldo Mufioz, one of Chile's
leading scholars, has been named
by the Aylwin government to be
Chile's ambassador to the Organization of American States in
Washington.
Newsday's Roy Gutman, who
authored BananaDiplomacy: The
Making of American Policy in
Nicaragua,1981-1987 (Simon and
Schuster, 1988), left Washington
in December 1989 for East Germany, where he serves as the
newspaper's bureau chief.
Geoff Pyatt, who served as a staff
assistant to the Inter-American
Dialogue, has joined the US
Foreign Service and is now the
third secretary of the economics
section of the US Embassy in
Honduras.
Marvin Carter, president of the Association of American Chambers
of Commerce in Latin America,
testified before the Congressional
Joint Economic Committee on
May 22, 1990. He suggested that
"most of Latin America has been a
victim of benign neglect and/or
crisis management by foreign
policymakers in both [US political]
parties."
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Democracy on a Tether
by Brian Loveman

tian Democrat Patricio
Aylwin took office as
Chile's first elected president since 1970. Thus
ended the authoritarian
government of General Augusto
Pinochet (1973-90).
Aylwin's inauguration, supported by the ideologically diverse
Concertaci6nde Partidospot la Democracia, represented the culmination of a process specified in the
Chilean constitution of 1980. In a
plebiscite held in October 1988,
voters rejected Pinochet's continuation in office. Pinochet's defeat
initiated a period of transition in
which he would remain in office
until March 1990, with voters
electing a successor and a congress on December 14, 1989. In
the meantime, Pinochet and the
opposition decided upon constitutional reforms that were approved
in a July 1989 plebiscite.
Throughout 1989 there was
doubt as to whether Pinochet or
his hard-line supporters would
allow the scheduled elections, or
whether an opposition candidate
would be allowed to take office if
Brian Loveman, professor ofpolitical
science at San Diego State University,
is the author of Chile (2nd ed.;
Oxford University Press, 1988).
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elected. The transition, the election campaign, and the political
debates were colored by an awareness that nothing could be taken
for granted and that the threat of
a preventive military coup or
government provocation could
never be entirely dismissed.
Yet Pinochet appeared to
believe that his historical role in
Chile, if unappreciated now,
would eventually be recognized: a
hero who had saved the country
from totalitarian communism,
reestablished law and order,
provided the constitutional foundations of a modern democracy,
and permitted a peaceful, legal
transition from authoritarian rule
to elected government. This vision
may have seemed implausible to
the majority of Chileans, but, as
the events of 1989 and early 1990
unfolded, Pinochet could respond
to his detractors that the transition had gone as promised. After
all, the results of the plebiscite of
October 1988 were acceptedeven though on the night of October 5, 1988, Pinochet and a
small coterie in desperation considered suspending the vote
count. In addition constitutional
reforms were adopted in the plebiscite of July 1989, with prior consultation and negotiations with
the opposition. The presidential
and congressional elections were

held, the votes fairly and quickly
counted, and the opposition candidate, Patricio Aylwin, declared
the victor.
Shortly after the elections,
Pinochet even invited Aylwin to
the presidential palace to discuss
the transition. Still, when Aylwin
suggested that Pinochet leave the
post of commander-in-chief of the
army-a position guaranteed to
him under the 1980 constitutionupon stepping down as president,
Pinochet politely declined.
In short the transition occurred
as scheduled and a gradual loosening of authoritarian controls over
radio, television, the press, and
political activity was achieved. The
basic rules of political life, the
tutelary role of the military in
Chilean politics, and the nation's
economic model have, however,
remained strictly those of
Pinochet. Chile was moving from
a harsh authoritarian regime to a
"democracy on a tether"-a transition whose process and pace were
dictated by the Pinochet government within a framework of
limited bargaining with the opposition bloc. Thus the incoming
president and his policy advisers
faced a number of formidable constraints in further democratizing
Chilean politics and in taking important policy initiatives during
their first year in office.

S

Pinochet's Legacies
The new political system installed
by the 1980 constitution, even as
modified by the 1989 reforms, was
inherently authoritarian, elitist,
and undemocratic. Appointed
senators, veto power over public
policy by a national security council, and the permanent tutelary
role of the armed forces constrained the exercise of the
popular will through elected representatives. Moreover the opposition that previously supported
Marxist or socialist institutions
and policies was emasculated or
temporized by the 16 years of official terrorism and repression that
transformed Chile's state and
economy. Arguably Chilean
politics had been polarized and
ideological, and a dose of pragmatism and reformism were essential for democracy to have a
chance. But the Aylwin coalition's
emphatic moderation represented
a powerful acknowledgement of
the tether General Pinochet fastened upon the caballitos in his corral. Terror and repression had
brought results.
Pinochet forced most of the opposition into a cautious and compromising mood regarding trial
or punishment of the armed
forces and security personnel guilty of human rights abuses. Many
leading opposition leaders
preferred to downplay threats
against the military in exchange
for a peaceful transition, military
"neutrality," and a gradual departure of Pinochet from the scene.
Pinochet sought to further constrain the Aylwin coalition by
enacting institutional reforms and
"organic laws" in 1989 and early

1990. Among the key measures
were the creation of a relatively independent central bank with
broad economic and monetary
authority and limitations on the
public sector's size. They also included tenure for government officials of the outgoing regime,
guarantees on military budget
levels, and a free hand in certain
policy and appointment matters
for the armed forces, as well as accelerating privatization of public
enterprises. In these ways
Pinochet sought to leave the incoming administration, in his own
words, "todo atado y bien atado."
The challenge facing the Aylwin
administration is to maneuver
within the confines of the tether,
until it can be loosened or cut,
and to meet some of the pent-up
demands of those who struggled
against the Pinochet government.

The Military
Perhaps the most sensitive and difficult area for Aylwin's new government is its relations with the
military. Divisions emerged within
the armed forces over support for
Pinochet and some of his policies.
Nevertheless, most military officers continued to be proud of
their role in "saving Chile from
communism." They remained
committed to a tutelary role in the
future political system, protective
of their institutional and professional prerogatives, and generally
insistent on immunity from trial
or punishment for alleged abuses
perpetrated during the last 16
years.
In September 1989 the pattern
of military retirements and promotions apparently reinforced

Pinochet's control and left his
loyalists in key command positions. Even moderates in the
armed forces insisted upon implicit guarantees from the Aylwin
coalition that they would not be
targets of retaliation after March
1990, that defense policy would
not be politicized, and that force
levels and budgets would not be
drastically reduced.
These issues represent fundamental challenges to the unity of
the Aylwin coalition and to the
authentic democratization of
Chile. Many Aylwin supporters
once suffered repression or exile.
They represent groups that
demand "justice," if not revenge.
The transfer of resources from the
bloated military budget to longpostponed programs of housing,
education, health, and nutrition is
an obvious way of meeting some
of their demands. Yet the risk of
offending military elites during
the first years of transition cannot
be ignored. It is difficult to imagine a stable democracy permanently facing the military sword of
Damocles: a democracy conditioned upon military approval of
key policy decisions or even individual judicial proceedings.
Thus civil-military relations pose
an immediate and critical dilemma for the new government. This
dilemma was intensified shortly
after Aylwin's inauguration by an
assassination attempt on an exmember of the military junta, air
force general Gustavo Leigh.

The Political and Economic Right
Chile's political right was devastated by the October 1988 plebiscite. Lacking alternative civilian
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or military leadership and disorganized by 16 years of government tutelage and internal lethargy, the political right cannibalized
itself in 1989. The major rightist
parties-acknowledging their inability to retain power without military intervention-failed to agree
on a candidate to face Aylwin.
Hence, while expecting an Aylwin
victory in December 1989, they
scrambled to capture congressional and senatorial seats through the
gerrymandered election system
imposed by the regime.
Chile's economic right--a
heterogeneous, dynamic, and
highly visible force in the 1980sdespaired at the agony of the
rightist political organizations.
The entrepreneurs feared a radical shift in macroeconomic and
sectorial policies if the Aylwin
coalition were victorious. In principle the entrepreneurs were not
opposed to a limited degree of
political liberalization-as long as
it meant neither serious populist
pressures nor an end to the "labor
discipline" that had made possible
the impressive economic gains of
recent years-but they tended to
favor continuity without Pinochet.
They looked to Aylwin for reassurances that his victory would
not significantly threaten their
economic interests. The Aylwin
program, however, implied somewhat higher taxes, modest wage
and salary gains for labor, and an
ambiguous level of income redistribution through government
programs.

The Aylwin Government
In January 1990 president-elect
Aylwin named a cabinet that consisted of representatives from a
number of coalition parties and
widely respected intellectuals and
professionals. Aware of the
delicacy of the transition, Aylwin
and his advisors proceeded with
moderation and deliberation.
They sought to reassure all sectors
that the seemingly incompatible
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objectives of satisfying labor,
entrepreneurs, human rights activists, the military, and "la gente"
were feasible. The key, the Aylwin
team argued, was for Chileans to
allow the new government some
breathing space.
Much depends upon the continued expansion of the Chilean
economy. In 1988-89 it experienced dynamic growth, led by exports of agricultural, forestry,
fishery, and mineral products. In
1989 the value of exports exceeded $8 billion, making Chile
the leading per capita exporter in
Latin America. Moreover a favorable balance of trade along with
debt-equity swaps and other incentives to foreign investors enabled
Chile to reduce its foreign debt.
Significant inflows of foreign investment contributed to the diversification of industry and the
expansion of the already booming
export sectors.
The elections of December
1989 focused attention on
Aylwin's economic program. The
new minister of finance, noted
economist Alejandro Foxley, has
reassured domestic entrepreneurs
and foreign investors that they
can expect continuity, with perhaps some income redistribution
through social programs and moderate tax reforms to generate income for government programs.
GD

PER

CAPIT

Entrepreneurs, of course, are well
aware of the vital role of "labor discipline" and low salaries (the minimum wage at the end of 1989 was
less than $60 per month) in
Chilean export competitiveness
and firm profitability. They therefore expressed concern about
several anticipated government initiatives. These include revision of
the labor code, encouragement of
unionization, and increases in the
minimum wage. In addition they
include tax increases and strengthened enforcement of safety,
health, and environmental regulations, which would raise production costs and diminish "private
property rights."
These concerns represent challenges for Foxley and the rest of
Aylwin's cabinet, especially because the Pinochet government
attempted to limit economic initiatives in three ways. First, it
adopted a budget that conflicted
with the new government's programmatic priorities. Second, it
established a new central bank
with authority over monetary
policy, foreign exchange, and
banking, which were previously
within the purview of cabinet officers. And third, it depleted the
special reserve fund accrued from
copper revenue.
The incoming administration
faces other economic and fiscal

1.
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worries as well. It fears that copper prices may decline from their
current high levels and that the international economy may weaken,
thereby muffling the expansion of
Chilean exports. It also fears that
demands for increased salaries
and for expanded government
spending on social programs and
economic infrastructure will
generate inflationary pressures.
Foxley reiterated these and
other concerns between December
1989 and March 1990. He suggested the need for a "social pact"
between labor and business
during the transition to avoid the
inflationary pressures and political
crises that plagued President Radil
Alfonsin of Argentina in that
country's transition from military
rule to democratic government.
The new minister of economy,
Carlos Ominani, emphasized the
need to resist the tendency to
adopt "populist measures." In a
sense the Aylwin team has an advantage: for 16 years it studied the
defects and successes of Pinochet's
economic policies. They understand the constraints imposed by
both the international economy
and the political exigencies of
democratization, and that satisfying the demands of the poorest
Chileans will, in the short term,
prove impossible.
So, while the economy is in rela-

tively good condition, a number of
foreseeable dangers confront the
Aylwin government. Among these
are the threat of inflation, vulnerability to price reductions in copper and other key exports, the requirement to reschedule the debt
payments due in 1990-92, the
challenges of labor relations and
of demands for an increased share
of the national income by nonentrepreneurial groups, and the
budgetary constraints bequeathed
by the Pinochet government.
No less important is the potential rise of tensions within the coalition. Underlying this potential are
the moderate tone of Aylwin's
economic team, the emphasis on
continuity with marginal redistribution, and the decision to accept
most of the privatization initiatives
and to seek further foreign investment. Resulting tensions would
pit the coalition's populist and leftist members against its Christian
Democratic leadership. Inasmuch
as the Aylwin term of office will be
four years-instead of the eight
specified by the constitution for
subsequent presidents--early jockeying among the coalition's
partners for electoral advantage
could exacerbate its fragility.
In sum the new government
faces the challenges of democratization and coalition management,
as well as the tether fastened upon
BA

it by the Pinochet government
and the demands of the millions
of Chileans whose living conditions declined during the past 16
years. No government could be expected to resolve these dilemmas
entirely. Further democratization,
amelioration of the misery of the
poorest Chileans, and continued
but slower economic growth represent an ambitious set of tasks.
The majority of Chileans
wanted the transition to proceed
smoothly and peacefully. The elections of December 14, 1989,
demonstrated the electoral weakness of both the radical right and
the revolutionary left. Pragmatism, reformism, and a desire for
accommodation seemed to prevail. As the government seeks to
deal concretely with the challenges before it, this spirit of
moderation will be sorely tested.
Key factors, therefore, will be:
how long can the original coalition be sustained in more or less
original form? What fall-back coalition will be created when the first
ministers and programs come
under attack? And how permanent will the new-found pragmatism of social democrats and
socialists be when their constituencies demand faster and more
profound departures from the
Pinochet legacy?
In the background will be the
political right and segments of the
military, with their implicit threat
to "correct" the political course
should it head in the "wrong"
direction. The Aylwin government's careful management of
civil-military relations and the
human rights issue will be critical
in forestalling a return to authoritarian politics-an outcome most
military officers and entrepreneurs, as well as the rightist parties, wish to avoid. March 1990
marked the hopeful beginning of
the restoration of democracy in
Chile. The restoration would be
neither easy nor complete, but
most Chileans were looking expectantly to the future.
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US-Chilean Prospects
US-Chilean relations were correct,
but cool, after the plebiscite of October 1988. Official and private
sources of US funds, technical assistance, and moral support for
the opposition angered Pinochet
and disappointed his policymakers.
Shortly after the plebiscite a
new US ambassador, Charles
Gillespie, replaced Harry Barnes,
who played a key role in supporting Pinochet's opposition. Ambassador Gillespie inherited a
number of unresolved bilateral
issues, including the assassination
of Orlando Letelier in Washington, sanctions against Chile under
the General System of Preferences
and Tariffs, exclusion from program benefits of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), and tensions over military
assistance programs. Chile's booming export trade also made the US
agricultural and industrial protectionism a central concern in
bilateral relations.
After resolving the "poisoned
grape" matter in April 1989, USChilean relations focused upon
broader trade issues, while US
diplomats in Santiago maintained
open and frequent contacts with
leading Chilean policymakers and
potential opposition appointees.
Private investors from large US
corporations (as well as investors
from Europe, Asia, New Zealand,
and Australia) expressed confidence in Chile's future. They did
so both in public statements and
in new investments in Chilean
mining, banking and finance,
agriculture, and industry. IBM,
Exxon, Citicorp, Chase Manhattan Bank, and other major US
firms committed significant new
resources to Chile in 1989.
Shortly before the December
1989 elections, a distinguished
group of Aylwin supporters visited
the US. Their purpose was to reassure Americans concerning the
political vision of the Concertacin
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and the Aylwin policy agenda.
Carlos Portales, an expert on USChilean relations, identified four
policy concerns: maintenance of a
flow of funds to Chile to support
macroeconomic stability; continued Chilean access to US markets; removal of sanctions against
Chile under the General System
of Preferences and Tariffs, thereby making Chile eligible for the
OPIC program; and approval of
an aid package to help finance
social programs.
With the advent of the Aylwin
administration, US-Chilean relations seem promising. There is
danger, however, in that Chile's
transition coincides with dramatic
transformations in Eastern
Europe and the USSR, as well as
more urgent matters in Latin
America, such as the political fallout from the Panama invasion,
the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, drug and

guerrilla-related activity in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, and debt
negotiations. US policymakers
might prove inattentive to the
need for economic assistance to
the fragile democratic coalition
headed by President Aylwin.
The success of Chile's transition
to democratic government
depends primarily upon internal
politics, economic acumen, and a
favorable world economy. Yet supportive US policies would bolster
the Aylwin government and the
democratic transition. Whether
US policymakers will take advantage of this opportunity
remains to be seen. *
Editor'sNote: This article is based on
a forthcoming chapterin James M.
Malloy and EduardoA. Gamarra,
eds., Latin American and Caribbean Contemporay Record, vol. 8
(Holmes and Meier, 1991).
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Rebirth of Consensus
by Pamela Constable

Correa was a hunted
man, a socialist living underground in militaryruled Chile, furtively
meeting with colleagues
in crowded soccer stadiums and
forcing himself to forget people's
names in case he were arrested
and tortured. Today he is Chile's
new minister of transportation.
Not long ago, Manuel Bustos
was languishing in a small village
in southern Chile, legally banished after numerous spells in prison, reviled by officials as a labor
agitator and political extremist.
Today he is photographed smiling
and shaking hands with industrial
leaders, publicly recognized as
their equal across the bargaining
table.
Not long ago, General Augusto
Pinochet was planning to project
his 16-year reign virtually into the
21st century, contemptuously dismissing his Christian Democratic
opponents as closet Marxists and
recycled hacks. Today he has
handed over the presidential sash
to Patricio Aylwin Azocar, 71-yearold leader of the Christian Democratic Party.

Healing Wounds
The change taking place in Chile
is more than a shift in power.
True, the sight of the persecuted
replacing the persecutors, and the
losers stepping aside peacefully to

Pamela Constableis Latin America
correspondentfor the Boston Globe,
and the winner of the 1989 media
awardfrom the Latin American
Studies Association.

accommodate the winners, is
remarkable in itself. But the key
point is that after years of hermetic divisions and harsh, glib
judgments, a process of genuine
consensus is building in a society
long polarized by fear and hatred.

Repatching this torn social
fabric has not been easy. The
mantle of Chile's 150-year democracy, discarded in anger by so
many respectable citizens in 1973,
is by no means fully refurbished.
The installation of President Aylwin and 158 elected members of
congress on March 11 inaugurated a tricky and vulnerable
period of civilian rule. There are
ample opportunities for sabotage
by factions of the army, the revolutionary left, and the antidemocratic right.

Chilean society remains
plagued by serious breaches, some
of which have been aggravated by
authoritarian rule. The historic
cultural gap between civilians and
the armed forces has widened
despite the years of military
"tutelage." Moreover the strain
has intensified with the prospect
that former or current officers
may be prosecuted and tried for
human rights abuses.
The economy has grown steadily since the severe recession of
1982, but the social gap between
rich and poor has become more
visible. The hardships of the
average factory worker or migrant
fruit picker-unprotected by
unions or social services-contrast
starkly with the lavish lifestyles of
the new stockbrokers or grape exporters who have prospered in
Pinochet's "privatized" economy.
Finally, a pronounced political
gap has developed. At one pole
are those who remember and
cherish Chile's democratic traditions. At the other are those who
are too young to recall these traditions or have become conditioned
to believe that the right to buy
and sell at will is much more important than the right to vote or
publish a newspaper.
Yet events since mid-1988
demonstrate that a majority of
Chileans, and most leaders across
the political spectrum, are anxious
to bury the phantoms of 1973.
They are willing to lay down their
partisan and ideological prejudices and to resolve their differences in a spirit of compromise.
Despite Pinochet's best efforts,
military rule has made most
Chileans appreciate, rather than
denigrate, the past.
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Calm and Reason
Ever since Pinochet's defeat in the
October 5, 1988, plebiscite-itself
partly a product of the remarkable coalition of diverse and quarrelsome opposition groups-the
process of consensus has been
strengthening by the day. First,
over the strong objections of
Pinochet, opposition leaders and
government ministers agreed on a
package of constitutional reforms
that won easy approval by the
voters. Next, leftists swallowed a
bitter historic grudge to support a
Christian Democrat for president,
and the ambitions of dozens of
congressional candidates were
negotiated away in order to make
a biased and unwieldy electoral
system work.
Then came the election of
December 14, 1989. The armed
forces repeatedly pledged to
respect the results, and the two
pro-government candidates instantly recognized Aylwin as the

winner. Furthermore the voters
rejected virtually all congressional
candidates on both political extremes in favor of moderate conservatives, Christian Democrats,
and socialists.
Addressing a jubilant crowd of
500,000 the next day, Aylwin-a
reassuring, grandfatherly figurevowed he would "loyally struggle
to make political power an instrument to unite and not divide, to
create and not destroy, to close
old wounds that still pain the national soul." From then on the
dire warnings of a return to "communist chaos" disappeared, and
pro-regime leaders moved to
make prudent peace with their
former enemies. Manuel Feliu,
head of the major business lobby,
signed a preliminary agreement
with Bustos, head of the largest
labor confederation. General
Fernando Matthei, the air force
commander who had dismissed
Aylwin's coalition as a "clown's
patchwork," expressed his
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support for the president-elect.
Equally significant, the language of confrontation and absolutes vanished from debate
about economic policy. Today's
tone is one of calm and reason.
Center-left economists are championing "fiscal prudence" and
conservative legislators-elect are
acknowledging the need to be
"socially responsible." After two
decades of ideological warfare and
five years of remarkable economic
recovery, a consensus is emerging
that market capitalism, tempered
by social consciousness and legal
limitations, is sounder than
statism or socialism as basis for
development.
As for Pinochet, whose rule was
based on keeping Chilean society
divided into armed and suspicious
camps, the forces of history have
simply been knitting around him.
The defeated military president
still wields enough power to
severely restrict Aylwin's maneuvering room during his transitional four-year term. But the country
is no longer at war, and the old
warrior seems an isolated anachronism.
Will the consensus hold? Of
course not: once the euphoria
fades, the inevitable rivalries will
resurface, the pent-up demands of
the poor will intensify, and the
days of hard bargaining will
begin. Deep-seated mistrust
remains on all sides, and powerful
antidemocratic forces continue at
work. But all signs indicate a
broad agreement to work within
democratic rules, and a new willingness to listen.
Soon, German Correa will be
negotiating with right-wing
truckers who once sabotaged the
Allende government. Soon,
former political prisoners will be
debating former regime ministers
in the senate. Already a former
dictator is legally reporting to his
democratically elected successor.
For a country that was exiled from
itself for 16 years, these are
miracles enough. .

New Books on Latin America and the Caribbean
Nicaragua Divided
La Prensa and the Chamorro Legacy

PatriciaTaylor Edmisten
"Edmisten puts current Nicaraguan politics into perspective and gives the reader a sense of the complexities of
the present situation."
-Charles Ameringer, Pennsylvania State University
UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA PRESS
March 0972-3 Cloth $19.95

Dictionary of Latin American
Racial and Ethnic Terminology
Thomas M. Stephens
"For the first time a comprehensive collection of racial,
ethnic, and regional designations has been brought
together in one place.... It should dispel myths about
the lack of overt and covert discrimination in Latin
American ... a valuable dialectological tool."
-John M. Lipski, University of Florida
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
March 0965-0 Cloth $45.00

The Journal of Don Francisco
Saavedra de Sangronis, 1780-1783
ed. FranciscoMorales Padr6n
trans.Aileen Moore Topping
"Theturbulent and immensely fascinating Spanish
colonial world of the Caribbean at the close of the
American Revolution is stunningly revealed in this
excellently translated journal."
-Robert V. Remini, University of Illinois at Chicago
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
0877-8 Cloth $28.00

Zespedes in East Florida, 1784-1790
Helen Hornbeck Tanner
"A very successful case-study of the East Florida
governorship in the first six years of Spain's return to the
peninsular province."--Americas
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA PRESS
0958-8 Paper $14.95

Jose Lezama Lima,
Poet of the Image
Emilio F.Bejel
"A stimulating and rigorous analysis of one of Spanish
America's most difficult and complex writers... a
significant addition to Lezama studies."-Justo C. Ulloa,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
April 0980-4 Cloth $19.95

Between God and the Party
Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Cuba
John M. Kirk
"A comprehensive and balanced survey of relations
between church and state in Castro's Cuba. ... Kirk's
careful analysis of the role of religion in the processes of
social change in Latin America ... also illuminates an
aspect of the Cuban revolution often ignored."-Choice
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA PRESS
0909-X Paper $15.00

First Encounters
Spanish Explorations in the Caribbean
and the United States, 1492-1570

ed. Jerald T. Milanich & Susan Milbrath
"An excellent paradigm of what historical archaeology
and history have to offer in illuminating our past."
-Bruce D. Smith, Smithsonian Institution
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA PRESS
0946-4 Cloth $44.95; 0947-2 Paper $16.95

University Presses of Florida
15 NW 15th Street, Gainesville, Florida 32611, 904-392-1351
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Evangelical Awakening
by David Stoll

to Latin America's
problems? Luis
Palau, the Argenhat if there were a
tine evangelist,
thought there was. That was why
he went to Guatemala in November 1982 to help evangelicals
celebrate the 100th anniversary of
Protestantism there. The eyes of
all Latin America were on Guatemala, he told a huge crowd in the
capital. They could make it the
first reformed nation in Latin
America. Guatemala could be a
country where the word of God
captivated so many military officers and entrepreneurs that it
brought about a social and political transformation. The gospel
could liberate Guatemalans from
the chains of sin, Palau went on,
and it could liberate them from
the chains of poverty, misery, and
oppression. Through the gospel
ofJesus Christ, the evangelist
promised, the new Guatemalan
could build a new society.
At the rear, soldiers lounged
about the walls of a grim medievallike structure, the old Polytechnic

W

David Stoll is a doctoral candidatein
anthropology at Stanford University
and the author of Is Latin America
Turning Protestant? (University of
CaliforniaPress, 1990).
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School for military officers, in the
bowels of which desaparecidoswere
said to be held. But it was a sunny
day on the crowded parade
ground, and the multitude
cheered. Palau was not going to
enter into debates about the current political situation: his message was spiritual. Besides, the
president of the country was standing beside him.
"Here the one in charge is
Jesus Christ," declared Efrain Rios
Montt, the born-again army
general who had seized power
eight months before. The tone of
his voice was harsh, almost belligerent, but hallelujahs rose from
the crowd below. "We defend ourselves not by the army or its
swords," he proclaimed, referring
to the most successful counterinsurgency force in Central America, "but by the Holy Spirit."
What Latin America lacked, the
general and the evangelist felt,
was born-again Protestantism;
only a mass conversion along
these lines, a moral transformation at the popular level, could
save Latin America from poverty
and chaos. "If we could eliminate
infidelity and immorality in Latin
America, we could cut poverty by
half in one generation," Palau was
accustomed to claim. "If a man
gives up immorality with women,
gives up getting drunk and all the
waste ... that goes with it, and

stops gambling, right there he is
salvaging a big chunk of his salary.... Consider the countries

where you needn't fear secret
police, where you can expect justice under the law, where the
military is under the guidance of
the people rather than oppressing
them, where education is valued,
where the press is relatively free,"
Palau reasoned. "Almost all such
nations have experienced spiritual
awakenings touching society at
the local level."
Four months later Pope John
Paul II stood on the same spot
and celebrated Mass. His organizers had vowed to surpass the previous assembly, and the crowd was
indeed somewhat larger. But
when the Pope called upon the
people to hew to their faith, it was
because the Catholic Church was
losing ground on many fronts. It
could no longer claim Latin America as its own. The traditional
religious monopoly was giving
way, inside the Catholic Church in
the form of dissident movements
and outside the Church in the
form of evangelical churches.

What Happened to Liberation
Theology?
Estimates suggest that since 1960
evangelicals have tripled to more
than 10% of Latin America's population. If that same rate of growth

continues, by early in the next century evangelicals will comprise a
third of the population. Owing to
high rates of Catholic nominalism,
they are already becoming the
majority of active churchgoers.
Evangelicals first became a major
presence in Chile, where they now
claim about 20% of the people,
and in the huge population of
Brazil, where they claim about
15%. Since the 1970s Central
America has taken the lead in
rapid growth: in Nicaragua evangelicals claim a fifth of the population, and in Guatemala a third.
The figures may be inflated,
but they worry Catholic authorities. Beleaguered parish priests
sometimes give even higher figures. Evangelical inroads are especially surprising in view of what
was supposed to be the wave of
the future in Latin America: liberation theology. The first signs of
liberation theology appeared following the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) and its effort to
renew the Roman Catholic
Church. Shoring up the Church's
popular base with social activism
meant alienating governments
and military establishments.
When Central America broke out
in open warfare in the late 1970s,
both advocates and enemies of
liberation theology pointed to it as
the reason for new forms of grassroots support for revolution.
Depending on your point of view,
"consciousness-raising" was mobilizing the masses or an insidious
new form of subversion. Government death squads began to murder priests and catechists and suddenly there was a martyr church,
with what appeared to be a vast
popular movement behind it.
A decade later evangelical
Protestantism is to be encountered
wherever one goes in Latin America, but liberation theology requires more searching. Author
Phillip Berryman notes that several times as many people belong
to evangelical churches as to the
"Christian base communities" that

put liberation theology into practice. Although base communities
continue to flourish throughout
Latin America, Berryman estimates they have been set up in
only about 10% of the parishes.

Persecution by governments
and opposition from much of the
Catholic hierarchy, including
Pope John Paul II, have taken
their toll. In a death-squad state
like Guatemala, liberation theology seems to have had the unintended effect of promoting
evangelical growth. When Catholic activists encouraged the poor
to confront power structures, they
abandoned the usual role of religion as an apolitical sanctuary.
Reprisals from the Guatemalan
army forced survivors to seek safe
haven, and they have found it in
conservative born-again churches.
As born-again Protestantism becomes a part of the alarming new
power configurations in the
Western Hemisphere, it continues
to be a popular movement on the
level of poor villages and neighborhoods. What skeptics interpret
as an ethic of passivity and resig-

nation is, according to many
converts, an experience of empowerment. Whether converts are
getting off the bottle, spreading
the gospel, or striving to improve
their lot, they often speak of gaining control over their lives and discovering their destiny.
Some of the clearest signs of
grace are North American in origin: the evangelist in suit and tie,
the stage revival, the trip to an international conference sponsored
by Billy Graham. Yet the rhythms
of the movement are very Latin
American. The vast majority of
Latin American evangelicals are
Pentecostals, who seek after special gifts of the Holy Spirit-speaking in tongues, prophecy, and
faith healing-which have affinities with the emotional states of
traditional folk Catholicism.
Ironically one of the directives
most often received from the Holy
Spirit is to break away from North
American control. Research by
missionaries, many of them associated with the Fuller School of
World Mission in Pasadena, California, shows that North Americans who try to stay in charge of
Latin American churches end up
choking off growth. When missionaries are forced to leave, it is
common for churches to grow
faster. After all, once local leaders
are on their own, the only way
they can make a living is by going
out and spreading the faith. As for
North American handouts-frequently accused of being the
reason for evangelical gains-they
are more likely to encourage internal squabbling than to attract lasting converts.
Under harsh austerity regimes,
evangelical churches have become
an opportunity for poor people to
organize themselves in a politically
safe way. Dismissing revolutionary
agendas as illusory, these groups
concentrate on the moral struggles of their members to stop
drinking, hold their families together, and work their way up in
the world. Far from representing
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diversionary issues, vice and virtue can determine whether the
poor survive in countries being
torn apart by the international
debt crisis and social violence.

Invasion of the Sects
In Guatemala the brief rule of
Efrain Rios Montt in 1982-83 was
more a product of the evangelical
boom than a cause of it. But he
left a powerful impression, preaching every Sunday over the airwaves while leading a ferocious
counterinsurgency campaign.
Rios Montt has come to symbolize
both the hope and dread over
evangelical expansion in Latin
America. Five years after being
deposed by fellow army officers,
he launched a campaign to be
elected president in 1991. Early
polls identified him as one of the
two frontrunners, even though
the Guatemalan constitution disqualifies him as the past leader of
a coup.
Among the most preoccupied
by Rios Montt is the local Catholic
hierarchy, which has spoken out
against the "invasion of the sects,"
and has accused the US government of encouraging evangelical
Protestantism as a way to keep the
region under control. This idea of
a born-again planning room deep
in the National Security Council
(NSC) sounds like a figment of the
imagination. Obviously it could
never explain a popular religious
movement, but it might explain
how that movement is being
manipulated. After all, an NSC official named Oliver North was no
figment of the imagination, nor
the way he and the Reagan administration used evangelicals as
part of their "low-intensity" warfare against the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua.
US influence-buying began
with the Miskito ethnic minority
on the Atlantic Coast, several
years before Oliver North came
on the scene. Since the Miskitos
are Moravian Protestants, this
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move focused Sandinista reactions
on the country's evangelicals. In
1980 a US diplomat began to
channel money to Nicaraguan pastors through an anti-Sandinista
missionary working for In-Depth
Evangelism, a Costa Rican spin-off
of the highly regarded Latin
America Mission. At one point 600
pastors--40% of the entire Nicaraguan pastorate-were receiving
small monthly installments from
this source.
As soon as the Sandinistas
began to crack down on evangelicals suspected of undermining
national defense, they could be
accused of religious persecution.
This task was undertaken by the
Institute on Religion and Democracy, a neoconservative group
dating to the start of the Reagan
administration. After the US
Congress cut off the contras for
their human rights violations,
various evangelical groups conferred with Colonel North on how
to provide them with "humanitarian" support. Evangelicals who
came to the aid of the contras-including Pat Robertson and the
Christian Broadcasting Network,
Gospel Crusade, Trans-World Missions, and the Christian Emergency Relief Teams-tend to be
charismatic, the style of Pentecostalism tarnished in the 1987-88
television scandals. One reason
charismatic Protestants found
North persuasive is that he is one
of them, as a member of the
Church of the Apostles in Fairfax,
Virginia.
Together with the Reagan administration, these groups portrayed Sandinista Nicaragua as a
furnace of religious persecution.
Actually evangelicals were always
free to worship. The Comit6 Evangilico Pro-Ayuda al Desarrollobuilt
up an impressive pro-Sandinista
evangelical alliance supported by
ecumenical Protestants in North
America and Europe. Gradually
the Sandinistas learned how to accommodate conservative Protestants, at the cost of allowing them

greater freedom to organize
against the revolution. Yet the
US-sponsored "freedom fighters"
pushed Nicaraguan evangelicals
into the line of fire, with such
devastating results that many
wanted to flee to the US-hardly
the way to build strong local
churches as most missionaries
realize.
Fearful of being burned themselves, the majority of evangelical
missionaries kept their distance
from the Reagan administration's
war in Nicaragua. Only a few
joined Catholics and ecumenical
Protestants in opposing it, however, encouraging the idea that
conservative evangelicals are
pawns of US foreign policy.
As the contra war shows, North
American missions continue to be
so influential that they can give
local evangelicals a reputation
they do not deserve. US-based
agencies still dominate evangelical
radio and television in Latin
America, supply the major
revivalists, train many of the national leaders, and finance the efforts to integrate the hundreds of
Latin American denominations
into suitably conservative national
alliances and councils. Even if the
vast majority of evangelicals now
belong to Latin American-run
churches, their leaders continue
to look to North Americans for
inspiration.
Evangelical politics is not just a
function of what missionaries
want, however. The churches
resulting from all the splits away
from missions, not to mention further splits ad infinitum, are
notoriously hard to organize and
lead in any particular direction.
High-publicity congresses such as
"Los Angeles '88," which drew
6,316 Hispanic delegates to
southern California and made
evangelicals look like a movement
coordinated from the US, beg the
question of who is represented
aside from the leaders transported
to the occasion by North American sponsors.

The Perils of Protestantism
Compared to Catholic martyrs
and Marxist revolutionaries, pious
folk singing hymns in cinderblock chapels are hard to visualize
as the blazing edge of social
change in Latin America. Yet as
sociologist David Martin points
out, these kinds of groups have a
long history. From the Protestant
Reformation to the Industrial
Revolution, in frontier awakenings in North America and now all
over the colonized world, congregational forms of social organization have helped the victims of
capitalist transformation survive it.
Evangelicals are not alone in
organizing new congregational
groups in Latin America. Some
Catholics are doing so as well by
promoting base communities and
the charismatic renewal, a
separate revitalization movement
that has adopted the Pentecostal
agenda of baptism in the Holy
Spirit. Each of these Catholic and
Protestant movements is organized around the Bible and small,
voluntary face-to-face groups that
reinforce and discipline their
members. Each is encouraging
poor people to redefine themselves, renegotiate their relations
with powerholders, and work out
new forms of survival in an ever
more menacing political economy.
Each is building up new kinds of
communities and redefining how
men are expected to behave
toward their families. "Tonight we
are going to weep!" a burly Guatemalan preacher bellows with his
fists slashing the air. "Tonight
grown men are going to break
down and cry!" How men treat
their families, how children are
socialized, and how people relate
to authority-basic relationships
in Latin American culture-are
being reworked in congregational
religion.
Once we draw parallels with US
and European Protestantism, it is
tempting to view evangelical
growth as a harbinger of success-

ful capitalism in Latin America,
that is, the kind that benefits the
majority of people. So believe
evangelists such as Luis Palau, as
do a growing number of converts
from Central America's monied
classes. Many are to be found in
affluent charismatic congregations
such as the Church of the Word,
which attracted Rios Montt several
years before he took power. Like
Oliver North, these affluent charismatics combine free-market
ideology with belief in miracles.

Looking for vindication as revolutionary movements threaten their
privileges, they hope to call down
the Holy Spirit on Central American capitalism and give it a sense
of moral responsibility.
With their suits and ties, Protestant evangelists project an image
of capitalist prosperity, an old and
tragic dream in Latin America. At
a time when the capitalist market
is triumphing politically around

the world yet continues to fail so
spectacularly for most Latin Americans, danger lurks in promising
rewards for Protestant virtue that
fail to materialize. What happens
when debt and disorder choke off
the possibilities for what missionary thinker Guillermo Cook has
called "redemption and lift"-the
past capacity of evangelical Protestantism to help converts move upward in the social scale?
So great is the ambiguity and
flux in grassroots religion that it is
time to think in terms of an overarching religious reformation
embracing both liberation theology and evangelical Protestantism.
The common denominator is congregational social organizationin the base communities of liberation theology, in the charismatic
renewal in Roman Catholicism,
and in the evangelical churches.
Interpreters of varying persuasions have given base communities an aura of radicalism and
evangelical congregations an
image of conformism. The reality,
though, is more complicated.
However different the ideas of
evangelical missionaries and political activists may be about the
direction their struggling believers
should take, the influence of outsiders has limits. Owing to the
punishment being taken by Latin
America's poor, there may be less
difference in the future between
base communities and evangelical
congregations than there is now.
Meanwhile evangelical Protestantism has become a rising indicator, along with debt, inflation,
unemployment, and violence. It is
also stirring Latin American fears
of deepening subordination to the
US. Is born-again Protestantism
really a vast revitalization movement, or is it just a manipulated
bearer of false hopes from the US?
In Central America, US policymakers and the religious right
have made it more difficult to
choose between these two interpretations than might otherwise
be the case. .
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Divided Nation, Divided Church
by Brady Tyson

electorate chose Fernando
Collor de Mello as the country's first popularly elected
president in 30 years. Yet the
n December 1989 Brazil's
electoral campaign laid bare a
trend of political polarization
within the nation and its Catholic
Church. On one side are interests
that fear rapid, radical social
change. On the other side are interests committed to the expansion of popular participation in
politics and to a more equitable
distribution of wealth.

From Brazil to Rome
During the electoral campaign
many bishops and cardinals openly or quietly sided with one side or
the other. For example, in an election-day homily on the conservative O Globo network's weekly
television show, Rio de Janeiro's
Cardinal-Archbishop Dom
Eugenio Salles lambasted the "leftist parties," repeating almost textually the charges of conservative
candidate Collor against his populist opponent, Luis Inicio "Lula"
da Silva. In contrast, a leading
bishop, Dom Mauro Morelli of a
diocese that neighbors Rio de
Janeiro, was part of a pre-election
welcoming delegation for Lula
and was mentioned as a possible
member of Lula's presidential
cabinet. Hundreds of priests openly campaigned for Lula, while

Brady Tyson, professorof international relations in the School of International Service, American University,
has served as a Methodist missionary
in Brazil.
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hundreds of others were equally
active on Collor's behalf.
The electoral activism and political division of the Confederafdo
Nacionaldos Bispos do Brasil
(CNBB) stem partly from the
Church's travails during the military dictatorship of 1964-85 and
partly from today's climate of hyperinflation and widespread impoverishment. Both sides of
Church leadership are painfully
aware of the gravity of the nation's
current economic ills. What
divides the Catholic hierarchy are
profound disagreements over the
causes of these ills and the proposed role of the Church in addressing them. When the
Church's upper echelons speak,
they tend to do so as progressistas
and conservadores, though neither
voice is monotonic.
During the military dictatorship the progressive movement
emerged within the Church to
defend priests and nuns from
government repression. The
evolution of the progressistas,which
involved the "preferential option
for the poor," as formulated at the
1968 Medellin and 1979 Puebla
conferences of Latin American
bishops, led to its advocating a
more communitarian Church.
This orientation fits the Latin
American-wide mold of ecclesiastical base communities. Heading
the progressistasare Dom Paulo
Evaristo Arns, a Franciscan who is
the cardinal of Sao Paulo; Dom
Aloisio Lorscheider, a former
president of the Episcopal Conference of Latin America who is
the cardinal of Fortaleza; and
Dom Luciano Mendes de Almeida, a Jesuit who is president of
of Mariana.
CNBB and bishop
. . . . . .,

Minas Gerais.
Since 1983, when the military
began to relax its iron hand, a
major surprise has been the
failure of Brazil's ecclesiastical
base communities to emerge as a
powerful new bloc of electoral support for populist politicians. Even
so, the country's 85,000 to
100,000 base communities, whose
total membership is three to four
million people, are significant in
the political mobilization of the
poor and as a school for new
grassroots leaders. Not only are
they activists in local development
and religious issues. The majority
of their hard-core members are
also activists in Lula's Partidodos
Trabalhadores(PT), where they represent more than a third of Lula's
political base.
The grassroots focus of the
progressistas contrasts sharply with
the top-down approach of most
conservadores. Such conservadores
generally stress passive acceptance
of the religious and sociopolitical
hierarchy and believe social
change must flow in slow, trickledown fashion. This approach
reflects the traditional orientation
of the European Catholic Church,
which deeply distrusts Third
World movements. It appeals to
the values of ordem e progresso
through the traditional hierarchy
and symbols of the Church, as
provided by Pope John Paul II.
Since the 1970s individualistic,
evangelical currents-which
provide a conservative Catholic
alternative to fundamentalist
Protestantism-have broadened
and invigorated the conservadores.
At the lead of the conservadores
are Cardinal Dom Eugenio Salles,
of the Rio de Janeiro archdiocese,
,J

and Cardinal Karl Ratzinger, a
German, who is president of the
Congregation of Doctrine and
Faith of the Curia, the Vatican's
powerful administrative body in
Rome. Under Ratzinger's strong
leadership, the Curia is even more
staunchly conservative than John
Paul II. It is therefore determined
to discipline, disband, and silence
the progressistas,in favor of a traditional European approach.
Strident criticism of the conservadores by the political left and the
progressistascaused some parishes
in Minas Gerais to vote for Collor,
out of fear the "communist leanings" of Lula and the Frente

Popularwould lead them to "close
the churches." During the presidential campaign, Rio de Janeiro's
major daily, OJornaldo Brasil, published two or three signed articles
each week by leading conservative
Catholic clergy, attacking their
counterparts in the progressive
camp. The conservative perspective is more culturally pervasive
and widely accepted among Brazilians than that of the progressistas,
who represent some 10% of the
electorate. A political disadvantage
of the conservadores is their limited
organization at the grassroots
level, though to some degree the
approach of the Catholic evangelicals-including their aggressive
use of the electronic media-is addressing this weakness.
Their differences aside, the
ideologies of both the progressive
and conservative camps are
anchored in the Catholic Church's
"organic" view of society. The
Church-including John Paul IIhas criticized capitalism as well as
communism, claiming that neither
comprises the truly just and orderly society espoused in the
Church's social teachings. This
view has propelled a search for an
elusive "third way" upon which to
build a harmonious world. Many
of the progressive camp's leading
bishops believe that, in their quest
for such a world, the main opposition within the Vatican is the

conservative bloc led by Ratzinger
and Salles; John Paul II, they
believe, is a potential ally.
From the progressive standpoint, the Pope has manifested
deep concern for the poor of
Latin America, Africa, and Asia;
and in spite of his emphasis on
the traditions of hierarchical structure and papal authority, he sympathizes with the progressive
movement's goals. Yet, according
to the progressistas,the Pope's
capacity to act on his sympathies is
restricted by the pronounced
conservative bent of the vast
machinery of the Catholic Church
and by his dependence on the
leadership and bureaucracy of the
Curia. The progressistasclaim that
a result of the organizational
leverage of Ratzinger and Salles is
that, of the 50 new Brazilian
bishops named during the tenure
of John Paul II, none has been a
progressista:all have represented
either the moderate or conservative blocs, thereby undercutting
the influence of the progressistasin
CNBB.

Brazilian Dynamics
Despite the efforts of the progressistas and conservadores alike, Brazilian society will continue moving
towards a tolerant secularism. Similar to Italians and French, Brazilians will tend to respect, but not to
adhere politically, to any sector of
the Church. The progressistas and
conservadores will remain significant minority political forces.
After all, they wield powerful
symbols and authority, and they
possess major cadres and organizational resources. The Church in
general, however, does not command the attention of most
Brazilians.
The struggle between the
Catholic progressistasand conservadores will continue to be played
out in Brazilian political forums,
but its principal arena will be
within the Church, including the
Vatican and world Catholicism. In

this respect Brazil is the world's
largest Catholic nation. Moreover
its religious currents are tightly
bound up with the daunting array
and depth of the country's social,
cultural, political, and economic
dynamics, as illustrated by the
spread of evangelical Catholicism.
Not surprisingly the Catholic
Church of Brazil is an innovator
in theological thought and practice.
Meanwhile the profundity of
Brazil's economic and social challenges call for its traditional political system-fragmented and
fragmentizing-to yield to a new
vision. At stake is the democratic
process of articulating and implementing one or another way out
of Brazil's current plight. This
process will continue to be stimulated by, and reflected in, the progressive and conservative sectors
of its Catholic Church. .

Turnabout
is fair play
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Haiti: New Cast, Old Script
by Alex Stepick

The Rainy Season
by Amy Wilentz. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1989. 427 pp. $19.95.
honking of car horns
awakened me before
dawn. I was living in the
Little Haiti neighborhood of Miami, and my
neighbors were prematurely celebrating the demise of Jean Claude
Duvalier after the US government
had mistakenly announced his
departure. By mid-morning the
celebration evaporated. It was
only the first of many times that
both US authorities and Haitians
mistakenly thought Haiti had
really changed.
Precisely a week later, I was
again awakened by pre-dawn
revelry from the streets. This time
Duvalier really had left, transported to France aboard a US
army plane. The celebration continued for a number of days, filling Little Haiti's streets with
people and an impromptu parade
of cars. Hope filled the air.
Over the next four years the
scene repeated itself again and
again as five governments came
and went, each promising improvements and democracy and
each failing to deliver on its
promises. Soon the phrase
"Duvalierism without Duvalier"
spread beyond the radical fringe.
Alex Stepick is associateprofessor of
anthropologyat FloridaInternational
University. His most recent publication
(with CarolDutton Stepick) is "People
in the Shadows: Survey Research
among Haitiansin Miami," Human
Organization (Spring 1990).
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The well-worn cliche, "plus ca
change, plus c'est la meme chose,"
could hardly be more apt. A
military junta, massacred voters,
fraudulent elections, and repeated
coups have been punctuated by
violence, looting, and apparent
chaos. A few Duvalierists have
been uprooted, killed, or exiled,
but many remain in place. And
the physical conditions that shock
and depress so many from the
developed world persist: the pervasive, wretched poverty and the
devastated, eroded landscape. It
all appears utterly hopeless, at
least to most foreigners.
When writing and talking
about Haiti, foreign journalists
and diplomats tend to fix their
concentration on the succession of
dictators. Except for quaint and
sporadic reports on voodoo, their
attention remains riveted on the
gleaming white national palace
and the surrounding military barracks. They search for the will and
desires of the Haitian masses by
talking to those who speak easily
understandable English. Then
they move on, called by the next
crisis in Nicaragua, El Salvador, or
perhaps China and Eastern
Europe. They do not have the
time to penetrate beyond their
dazzling and depressing first impressions of Haiti.
Appearances can be deceiving,
though, especially in Haiti. Between the violent punctuation
points and the repetitious riot
scenes, social forces move individuals; and since Duvalier's departure, subtle rearrangements in
these forces have emerged. Grassroots organizations have arisen;
liberation theology inspires; the
press speaks; and the forces of the

old regime-the various divisions
of the armed forces, the mulatto
elite, and the Duvalierists-scramble to recover their power and
constrain the new forces.
Most foreigners, and especially
journalists, fail to see all these occurrences. A few journalists, fortunately, are exceptions. They
learn Creole. Then they venture
alone beyond Port-au-Prince and
listen to those who otherwise have
no voice.

A Deeper View
Amy Wilentz, who first went to
Haiti as one of the pack covering
the impending downfall of Jean
Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, has
produced a book that easily outshines the journalistic reports of
publications such as the New York
Times, the Washington Post, and
Time. Wilentz stayed longer, knew
more Creole, and talked to more
Haitians than any other journalist
since Bernard Diederich, who
detailed Frangois "Papa Doc"
Duvalier's rise to power.
Her book details the three
years of instability from the fall of
Baby Doc Duvalier in early 1986
to the beginning of 1989. While
scholars will find fault with her
book, she depicts a Haiti far more
complex and more human than
other journalists describe, and far
more vivid and accessible than
scholars report.
The hero of her story is Father
Jean-Berprand Aristide, the
diminutive, charismatic Salesian
priest whose stirring sermons and
fearless deeds galvanized many of
Haiti's poor in the aftermath of
Duvalier's departure. Aristide
emerges as a remarkably coura-
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geous man, as when he walked at
the front of a march on Fort
Dimanche, the ending point for
many of Duvalier's enemies. Soldiers fired on the crowd, but
Aristide marched forward with
Bible and microphone in hand,
broadcasting the incident live for
Radio Soleil (Haiti's Catholic-run
radio station). Six were killed and
more than 50 wounded. Aristide
became a national hero.
Later, he himself became the
enemy as attacks came both from
more conservative forces within
the Church and from the armed
forces. In a sense Aristide's popularity saved him. To martyr him
would have roused the masses
even more than his stirring sermons. The Church ordered him
out of the country, but the book
ends in January 1989 with his
refusal to leave. Instead he had
gone into hiding, sending cassettes to radio stations urging an
uprising: "Alone we are weak;
together we are strong. Together,
we are the flood. The blessing of
the Lord is upon the people. Let
his grace descend until the flood
itself brings down all Duvalierists,
all Macoutes, all criminals from
this day forth and forever more,
amen" (p. 391).
There is no doubt where
Wilentz's sympathies lie-with
deep, fundamental change, empowerment of the urban and rural
masses, and dechoukaj, "the uprooting of the old system"-but the
book does not focus solely on
Aristide and the popular organizations that arose in the wake of
Duvalier's departure. Wilentz provides a voice to the opposing factions within Haitian society. She
poignantly contrasts her
firsthand
herm
cotrst
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experiences with Aristide to the
impressions, stories, and rumors
sown by his enemies-US Embassy officials, American missionaries,
and voodoo priests formerly close
to Duvalier.
For example, she persuasively
portrays the views of the mulatto
elite by focusing primarily on a
dinner party she attended in
Petionville, the most exclusive suburb of Port-au-Prince. Wilentz effectively presents the positions of
the US Embassy spokesman, as
she charts his drift from firm optimist as the Namphy junta
promised democracy, to dejected
skeptic immediately after the election massacre of November 1987.
International journalists also occupy a central place, although her
portrayal of many of them is less
sympathetic than her picture of
Haitians, even Duvalierists.
Wilentz, however, apparently
did not have any close contacts
within the Catholic Church hierarchy, the one group that has no
voice in her book. She accurately
describes the Church as riven by
divisions between progressives
and conservatives, but no one argues the cause of the Church as
an institution, its fundamental concern for maintaining nearly 2,000
years of spiritual integrity. While
politics have always intruded on,
and were frequently launched by,
the Church, politics were usually
restrained if the Church risked expulsion or if the society, at least in
the minds of conservative Church
leaders, risked breakdown. The
Haitian Catholic Church did experience expulsion under Papa Doc,
and to some, the politics of Aristide and other progressives endangered the fundamental cohesion
of the society. While one may disagree with the position of conservative Church members, it would
have been better for Wilentz to
give a voice to those conservative
forces who, for the moment, have
regained the upper hand.
Wilentz attempts to provide
context and historical depth. She
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provides condensed descriptions
of the Haitian Revolution (17921804), foreign (especially US) aid,
the genesis of deforestation and
erosion, the evolution of Haitian
politics from the ashes of the
Revolution, and the social and cultural meaning of voodoo. These
historical synopses provide a
framework for interpreting her
travels and exploits with peasants,
political candidates, development
workers, voodoo priests, missionaries, children from the poor
neighborhoods, army officials,
and vigilantes.

Who's Responsible?
The book's most important
achievement is that it conveys the
frustrations and failures of Haiti's
recent efforts to obtain democracy
without implicitly resorting to the
racist explanations that commonly
gird the opinions of non-Haitians.
In the wake of the 1987 election
massacre and subsequent military
regimes, some US officials stated
that no one could "expect anymore from Haiti" than dictators,
repression, and corruption. The
responsibility for terror and corruption was swiftly hung on the
regime, and either explicitly or
implicitly upon the entire people
and culture or upon an entire
race.
Journalists are more subtle
than American officials. Rather
than directly blaming individuals
within Haitian institutions, jour-

nalists typically describe the horrible events, indicating that the
army or "thugs" were responsible.
Little effort and few column
inches are devoted to addressing
the question of what interests the
army and "thugs" are defending
so violently. Similarly journalists
seldom address why a dictator
stays in power.
These omissions imply that the
sole basis for the stability of nondemocratic regimes is repression.
Thus comes the expectation that
when a repressive regime is
removed, democracy and freedom
will follow.
This perspective overlooks the
extent of domestic and international support for the dictatorial
regimes. Through both repression
and concession, Papa Doc
recruited and consolidated support, most obviously in the armed
forces, but also among civilians
who gained access to power and
wealth. These Duvalierists have
struggled unceasingly to retain
their privileges. Moreover the
Duvalierist power base was built
upon the solid foundation of unequal social relationships between
mulattos and blacks and between
city and country, which have existed since the French established
plantations in Haiti. There are
thus many others, such as merchants and those involved in the
assembly industries, who may not
be firm Duvalierists, yet who see
grassroots democratization as a
threat to their interests.
Experts on Haiti will find fault
with much that is left out of
Wilentz's analysis of Haitian social
structure. More important, however, are the details and narrative
she does include, which provide a
sympathetic and compelling account of the three years of Haiti's
struggles after Duvalier fled for
France. u

(Photos by Gary Monroe, Photography
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New and Recent Books on Latin America
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA
Tom J. Farer
In this collection of essays, Tom Farer examines critically the stand taken by U.S. foreign policy makers on
such issues as right- and left-wing dictatorships, revolution, human rights and national autonomy. In this
fascinating manner, fusing sharp observations at times with polemical intent, Farer scrutinizes the key
assumptions, including the "Soviet or revolutionary threat," which have guided American foreign policy for Latin
America since the end of World War II. Farer describes the grand strategy of the United States in Latin America
(he sees very much the same strategic assumptions guiding U.S. policy throughout the Third World) as
unrealistic and misguided in terms both of U.S. interests and ideals. His essays combine a sophisticated
analysis of Latin American society with assessment of U.S. policy from legal, moral and strategic perspectives.
$39.95
448 pp.
ISBN: 0-88738-155-3 (cloth)

THREE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGISTS
GINO GERMANI, PABLO GONZALES CASANOVA, FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO
Joseph A. Kahl, new Introduction by Peter B. Evans
This is the long overdue second edition of Joseph A. Kahl's masterful Modernization, Exploitation, and
Dependency in Latin America. In the book, Kahl describes, examines and introduces the life and work of three
of the most important figures in the development of comparative politics and political sociology: Gino Germani
(Argentina), Pablo Gonzales Casanova (Mexico) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil). As Peter B. Evans
points out in his splendid Introduction, the book has not lost its importance and attractiveness in the years that
have passed. Rather, the subsequent developments in comparative scholarship, as exemplified in the fate of
modernization and dependency theory, have only highlighted the influence of the three Latin Americans.
$24.95
ISBN: 0-88738-169-3 (cloth)
$14.95
240pp.
ISBN: 0-88738-700-4 (paper)

POLITICS AND PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR
John D. Martz
In this book, John D. Martz probes the differences and similarities between military authoritarianism and
democratic pluralism through an analysis of the politics of petroleum in Ecuador. Martz uses a textured and
detailed analysis of global oil companies and nationalist politics to trace the growth and evolution of Ecuador's
petroleum industry. Against this interplay of politics and the nationalistic struggle against multinational
pressures, he compares policymaking under military and civilian government.
$34.95
432 pp.
ISBN: 0-88738-132-4 (cloth)

REVOLUTION AND REACTION: BOLIVIA 1964-1985
James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra
This volume focuses on two decades of political life in Bolivia, from the overthrow of civilian president Victor
Paz Estenssoro in November, 1964 until his return to office in August, 1985. The body of the book provides an
account of the main contours of political economy in Bolivia from 1964 until 1985. The authors also present an
interpretative analysis of the problem of regime formation in Bolivia by focusing on the alternations among
various authoritarian and democratic modes of governance. In a concluding chapter the authors provide an
analytical framework tying Bolivia into more regional trends concerning the questions of regime formation and
transition. Bolivia is seen as an extreme case of a common set of problems that have pervaded the region
during this period.
$29.95
256 pp.
ISBN: 0-88738-159-6 (cloth)
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Protestantism in Latin America
by Marian Goslinga

Although

Protestantism has always maintained a tenuous foothold in Latin America, the 20th century has

witnessed a veritable upsurge in evangelical missionary activities throughout the region. The resulting
success has been at the expense of the Roman Catholic Church and can partly be explained by the
latter's failure to align itself with the prevailing forces of change.
In general the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America has continued to promote those traditional
values and conservative concepts that can no longer fully satisfy large segments of an increasingly restless
as well as more sophisticated population. The Protestant churches-mainline as well as the various "sects"-have
stepped into this vacuum and, in most countries, have become a power to be reckoned with.
The following is an overview of recent publications on the subject.
Anglicanism in Nicaragua, 17451985. Robert W. Renouf. Anglican
and EpiscopalHistory, v. 57 (December 1988), p. 382-96.

Bible in Hand: Evangelics March
in Tikal, Guatemala. Paul Lewis.
New York Times, v. 138 (June 15,
1989), p. 4.

Apuntes para una historia de
presbiteranismo en Cuba. Rafael
Cepeda, et al. La Habana: Ediciones Su Voz, 1986.

The "Big Mango" and Christian
Mission. Roger S. Greenway.
UrbanMission, v. 6 (November
1988), p. 7-55. [About Mexico.]

At Home in Latin America:
Anglicanism in a New Context.
John L. Kater Jr. Anglican and
EpiscopalHistory, v. 57 (March
1988), p. 4-37.

British Baptist Missionaries and
Baptist Work in the Bahamas.
Peter Brewer. Baptist Quarterly,
v. 32 (April 1988), p. 295-301.

The Base Movement as a Model
of "Development." J. J. Kritzinger. Missionalia,v. 17 (April
1989), p. 31-44. [A comparison of
Latin American and African communities.]

La cantera de donde fuimos
sacados: testimonios hist6ricos
bautistas.Jose Maria Ruiz, et al.
Jorge Pixley, ed. Managua: Centro
Intereclesial de Estudios Teol6gicos y Sociales, 1988. [About
Nicaragua.]

Befriad Kyrka: Latinamerikansk
teologi. Carl Fredrik Hallencreutz. Svensk Missionstidskrift,
v. 77, no. 1 (1989), p. 1-53.
Being Evangelized in El Salvador.
Tim Dutcher-Walls. ChristianCentury, v. 105 (November 30, 1988),
p. 1084-85.
Marian Goslingais the Latin
American and Caribbeanlibrarianat
FloridaInternationalUniversity.
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Caribbean Churches and the
Redemptive Use of Mass Media.
Robert Bernhardt. CaribbeanJournal of Religious Studies, v. 9 (April
1988), p. 27-34.
Celebration: A Centenary History
of the Aramalaya Presbyterian
Church, Tunapuna, Trinidad,
1881-1981. Marianne Soarez
Ramesar,HoraceBhupsingh.
Tunapuna, Trinidad: Aramalaya
Presbyterian Church, 1988.

The Central American Evangelicals: From Protest to Pragmatism. Everett A. Wilson. International Review of Mission, v. 77
(January 1988), p. 94-106.
Christian Hope for Liberation
and Popular Movements. Aloisio
Krohling. Mission Studies, v. 6, no.
1 (1989), p. 35-40. [About Brazil.]
Church Growth in Acapulco:
Planting a Whole Presbytery.
Richard Dye. Urban Mission, v. 3
(January 1986), p. 34-38.
A conselhamento pastoral e
libertagio. Lothar Carlos Hoch.
Estudos Teoldgicos (Brazil), v. 29,
no. 1 (1989), p. 17-40. [Discusses
Protestant and Catholic practice.]
La cultura como mediaci6n para
evangelizar la no-creencia en
America Latina.Jaime Vilez
Correa. Bogota: Consejo Episcopal
Latinoamericano, 1989.
De sectas a sectas: una aproximaci6n al estudio de un fen6meno
apasionante. Angel Saldanra, et al.
Mexico: Claves Latinoamericanas,
1987. [About Mexico.]

Delegates of the World and the
Sleeping Giant: Religion as
Interclass Politics in a Rural
Panamanian Community. Gloria
Rudolf. UrbanAnthropology and
Studies of CulturalSystems and
World Economic Development, v. 17
(Winter 1988), p. 323-50.
Etica protestante y progreso
econ6mico: las colonias agrarias
holandesas calvinistas en Argentina y Brasil. Fred Jongkind.
Cristianismoy Sociedad, v. 27, no. 1
(1989), p. 83+.
Familiar Hymns in an Unfamiliar
Context: Congregational Song in
the Revival Zion Churches of
Jamaica. Terry E. Miller. Hymn,
v. 40 (January 1989), p. 15-19.
Five Principles of Indigenous
Church Organization: Lessons
from a Brazilian Pentecostal
Church. Reed E. Nelson. Missiology, v. 17 (January 1989), p. 39-51.
Die Frommen und die SiinderZivilisierte und Wilde: Die
Mission der Rama in Mittelamerikanischen Tiefland. Robin
Z. Schneider. Missiology, v. 14, no.
4 (1988), p. 221-31. [About the
missionary activities of the
Moravian Church in Central
America.]
The Fundamentalist Surge in
Latin America. Penny Lernoux.
ChristianCentury, v. 105 (January
22, 1988), p. 51-54.
God's People Have Suffered
Enough. Statement by the Anglican Bishops at Lambeth. Witness,
v. 72 (May 1989), p. 20-21. [About
Central America.]

Hacia una fe evangelica latinoamericanista: una perspectiva
bautista.Jorge Pixley, ed. San Jose:
Editorial DEI, 1988.
Haitian Christians Press on Amid
Poverty, Violence. David Disch.
Christian Times, v. 33 (May 12,
1989), p. 46-48.
The House Church as a Tool for
Urban Evangelism. Donald Jones.
Urban Mission, v. 6 (March 1989),
p. 27-32. [About Paraguay.]
Iglesia, cristianismo y religi6n en
America Central: resumen bibliografico, 1960-1980. Guillermo
Melindez. San Jose: Editorial DEI,
1988.
Inmigraci6n, libertad de cultos y
desarrollo econ6mico. Jean
Baptiste Bastian, ed. Cristianismoy
Sociedad, v. 27, no. 1 (1989), p. 5100.
Is Latin America Turning
Protestant? David Stoll. University
of California Press, 1990.
Jesus and El Salvadorean
Women. Ruth Mooney. Daughters
of Sarah, v. 15 (May-June 1989),
p. 8-10.
Latin America Evangelist. Coral
Gables, Florida: Latin America
Mission. [Periodical that began in
1921 and is still being published
on a regular basis.]
Latin American Pentecostalism.
Miriam Reidy. One World, no. 135
(May 1988), p. 6-7.
Liberation at Ground Level.
Wayne W. Foltz-Urffer. Christianity

and Crisis, v. 49 (February 20,
1989), p. 93-94. [Review of Faith of
a People: The Story of a Christian
Community in El Salvador, 19701980, P. Galdamez (1980).]
La lucha por el control religioso
e ideol6gico en la Argentina:
invasi6n de sectas y corporaciones. Hugo Ortega. Servicio de
Informaciones Religiosas, no. 78
(March 1986), p. 15-18.
Methodism's 150th Anniversary
in Argentina: An Occasion for ReEvaluating the Missionary Role.
Raymond K. DeHainaut. International Review of Mission, v. 77
(January 1988), p. 87-93.
Metodismo, campesinado y lucha
por la tierra: dos experiencias.
Roy H. May. Cristianismoy
Sociedad, v. 26, no. 2 (1988), p. 7390. [About Bolivia and Costa Rica.]
Ministering in Nezahualcoyotl:
The Community as the Resource.
Mariano Avila. Urban Mission, v. 6
(November 1988), p. 33-42.
Mission and the Land: Whose Is
the Earth? Michael Knoch. One
World, no. 141 (December 1988),
p. 11-14. [About the Evangelical
Lutheran Church's Small Farmers' Support Centre in Brazil.]
Missionaries to Nepal, Colombia
Find Freedom. Kenneth H. Sidey.
Christianity Today, v. 33 (April 7,
1989), p. 47-51.
A New Pentecost Hope in Solidarity. John H. Sinclair. Christian
Century, v. 106 (January 25, 1989),
p. 83-84. [About socioeconomic
conditions in Latin America.]
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Publications Update

Nicaragua: On Retreads and
Prayers. Susan E. Pierce. Witness,
v. 71 (April 1988), p. 14-24.
[About the Episcopal Church.]

Popular Religiosity and Evangelization in Latin America.
Samuel Runz. SEDOS Bulletin,
no. 5 (May 15, 1988), p. 155-66.

"No somos personas extravagantes." Analia Bernardo. Servicio de
Informaciones Religiosas, no. 110
(May 1989), p. 16-17. [About Pentecostals in Latin America.]

Protestantism in Rural Guatemala, 1872-1954. Virginia
Garrard Burnett. Latin American
Research Review, v. 24, no. 2
(1989), p. 127-42.

One Nicaraguan Christian's
Perspective. Gustavo Paraj6n.
ChristianityToday, v. 33 (March 3,
1989), p. 48.

Protestantismo e inmigraci6n en
Brasil: su implantaci6n en el contexto del proyecto liberal modernizador y las consecuencias del
mismo. Martin N. Dreher.
Cristianismoy Sociedad, v. 27, no. 1
(1989), p. 59-74.

Panorama del protestantismo en
Cuba: la presencia de los protestantes o evangelicos en la historia
de Cuba desde la colonizaci6n
espaniola hasta la Revoluci6n.
Marcos Antonio Ramos. San Jose:
Editora Caribe, 1986.
Pentecostales enfrentan el desafio continental. Anibal Sicardi.
Servicio de Informaciones Religiosas,
no. 110 (May 1989), p. 6.

tischer Eschatologie in den
gesellschaftlichen Konflikten
Mittelamerikas. Heinrich Schaifer.
Zeitschriftfiir Missionswissenschaft
und Religionswissenschaft, v. 73, no.
2 (1989), p. 138-45.
The Revelations of Spiritual Baptists in Barbados: 30th Anniversary. Barbados, 1987.

Protestantismo, liberalismo e
magonaria no Brasil do seculo
XIX. Lothar C. Hoch, ed. Estudos
Teoldgicos (Brazil), v. 27, no. 3
(1987), p. 195-279.
Das Reich der Freiheit: Uberlegungen zur Funktion millenaris-

Surgimiento o invasi6n fundamentalista a America Latina?
Bernardo L. Campos. Servicio de
Informaciones Religiosas, no. 99-100
(April-May 1988), p. 15-17.
Symbols of Salvation: A Local
Mayan Protestant Theology.
David Scotchmer. Missiology, v. 17
(July 1989), p. 269-81.
The Ten-Year Crusade towards
the Third Christian Millennium:
An Account of Evangelization
2000 and Lumen 2000. Ralph
Della Cava. Paper presented at
the Conference on "The Right in
Latin American Democracies,"
Columbia University, April 20-21,
1990.

Mexican Academic ClearingHouse
(MACH)

To Be a Poor Church. Mark
Olson. The Other Side, v. 25
(March-April 1989), p. 9-10.
[About Haiti.]

Materiales Academicos de Consulta
Hispanoamericana/Mexican Academic Clearing House (MACH)
has been exporting library materials worldwide since 1969.
* MACH sells single and multiple copies of Mexican books
and serials, including government publications.
* MACH handles selective blanket order services for
academic libraries.
* MACH gives free referral service and periodical book
lists.

Too Much Separatism? M. E. Harrison. Urban Mission, v. 5 (March
1988), p. 40-41. [About Evangelical churches in Peru.]

Write for further information to MACH, Apartado Postal 13-319, Delegaci6n
Benito Jusrez, 03500, Mexico, D.F. Telephone numbers (915) 674-0567 and
(915) 674-0779.

i

Hemisphere . Winter/Spring 1990

The Roots and Fruits of Brazilian
Pentecostalism.John P. Medcraft.
Vox Evangelica, v. 17 (1987), p. 6794.

Valores morais e liberalismo no
protestantismo batista da Bahia
no seculo XIX. Narli Geralda
Teixeira. Estudos Teoldgicos
(Brazil), v. 27, no. 3 (1987), p. 26979.

